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PRE?ACE 
This study of the reconstruction era of American history is 
based primarily upon editorials from the leading newspapers 
published during that period. out of the multitude of facts 
which may be considered within the domain of reconstruction 
time, those have been selected which seem best fitted to ex-
1 
1 plain the more outstanding political, constitutional and leg-
islative developments. The editorials necessarily follow a 
natural chronological sequence as the national events developed 
from day to day. Therefore, events have been grouped into five 
chapters according to chronological order. An attempt has 
been made to give proper unity to the entire study and also to 
stress Negro Suffrage, Radical politics, and the leading issues 
which ultimately changed the course of American History. 
It is admitted that sectionalism and political color found 
their way into the editorial pages, but in answer to this the 
reader is reminded by one writer that " the periodical press 
still remains the most important single source the historian 
has at his command for the reconstruction of the life of the 
1 
past three centuries". James Ford Rhodes has a well known his-
tory of the reconstruction era, and his opinion regarding evi-
dence is of value to us here. He writes,"take the newspaper for 
what it is, a hasty gatherer of facts, a hurried commentator 
on the same, and it may well constitute a part of historical 
1. Lucy Maynard Salmon, The Newspaper and the Historian, 
oxtord, 1923,p. 491. 
2 
evidenoe". 
In this study, newspaper material constitutes the fundamen-
tal part of the historical evidence. However, this has been 
balanced by the use of two standard historical texts, those by 
Oberholtzer and Rhodes, and use has been made of general sec-
ondary works, reminiscences, biographies 811ld a small amount of 
manuscript source material. A combination of these sources re-
sults in a view both of public opinion and individual ideas. 
The idea throughout has been to seoure views froa both sides, 
and in the absence of very much Southern material, it has been 
necessary to use a considerable amount of Northern Democratic 
opinion. The Northern papers have been selected from a group of 
cities in different states with the hope that a comprehensive 
view might be obtained. 
In a work like this it is impossible to evaluate material 
properly without recognizing some of the leading personalities 
oonneoted with the writing. Editorial writing reached its eli-
max in Ameriaa during this era under the guidanoe of suoh writ-
ers as E. L. Godkin, George William Curtis, Horace Greeley, 
Henry Raymond, and others included in our study. 1~. Oswald 
Villard of The Nation remarks,"we have a steady waning of in-
dividualism in the daily periodical, marked first by the dis-
appearanae of the great editor'iihose personality formerly 
2. James Ford Rhodes, "The Newspac,r. as Historical Sourcesr 
Atlantio Monthlz, y,19o9. p. 65o. 
3 
shown through its pages". There can be no doubt that these men 
exerted great influence during their time and for this reason 
their opinions are of value in reconstructing the story of 
national events from 1864 to 1868. Both Oberholtzer and Rhodes 
have used considerable periodical material from these writers 
in their standard volumes on reconstruction. Concerning them 
Frederic L. Paxson has stated, "Their differences in point of 
view are wide, but between them they cover most of the impor-
4, 
tant facts". 
American history developed rapidly after Civil War days into 
what F. L. Paxson oalls"the New Nation". It has been the aim 
of this study to show some of the movements which lead to the 
change. Probably no other period shows the absurd lengths to 
which our two-party system may be carried,9r the possible dis-
aster for our nation in depending upon political organization 
such as now exists. Even the Constitutional basis of the ex-
ecutive, legislative and Judicial departments was seriously 
endangered during Johnson's time. Andrew Johnson ie presented 
here as one of the leaders, and no attempt has been made 
either to justify or condemn his part in national events. When 
his aame was forgotten following the impeachment trial, all 
attention was turned to the Democratic Convention in New York 
City. America was now facing'' new era. 
3. Oswald G. Villard, The Press Today, New York, 1930, p. 47. 
4. F.L. Paxson, Recent History o? the United States, 
New York, 1921~ p. 19. 
CONTENTS 
CHAPTER I 
The Beginning of a Second National Crisis 
causes of Johnson's accession-- The Union Convention of 1864--
Lincoln and public opinion--Political expediency--The slavery 
issue--Johnson's past record--First signs of reconstruction--
Lincoln's plan criticized--Demand joint action of Congress and 
President--Sectional feeling in pulpit and press--Defecti•e 
primary system--Negro suffrage as a political issue--Signs of 
trouble in the Cabinet--Attention turns to Congress. 
CHAPTER II 
Reconstruction Started 
Presidential power and the pe,ople--Lincoln and radical opinion-
--stanton's suggestion--Johnson's proclamation--Republican 
caucus, May 12, 1865--Negro suffrage as chief issue--The Lin-
coln-Johnson plan arouses antagonism--Southern editors create 
impression of disloyalty--Johnson's plan hangs in the balance--
Public and Congressional opinion--Relation between President 
and Cabinet--An optimistic press--Prearranged plans in Congress 
--Private letters from the South--Presidential plan attacked--
A lack of genuine Southern evidence--Editorials predict a 
harmonious reconstruction. 
CHAPTER III 
A Test of Power 
unavoidable conflict--sectionalism predominates in Congress--
veto Of Freedmen's Bureau Bill--A disastrous speech--Radicals 
plan to force their issue--Part ot the press remains loyal to 
Johnson--An unnecessary veto--Editorial opinion makes its 
first complete change against the President--Conciliation now 
impossi-le--New Orleans riots arouse public sentiment--Johnson 
appeals to the people--Some harmful speeches--No reconstruct-
tion without negro suffrage--severe denunciations--The South 
loses hope--A radical victory. 
CHAPTER IV 
Congressional Domination 
Negro suffrage inevitable--The District of Colambia Bill--An 
ineffective veto--Congress and the Supreme Court--Impeachment 
as a possible solution--Stevens' ~construction plan dominates-
Dissension in the Cabinet--Tenure-of-Office-Act---Stevens and 
confiscation--Fundamental arguments--Divided public sentiment--
New England versus the South--stanton removed--Impeachment and 
politics--A powerless Executive--The Copperheads denounce 
Johnson--The Impeachment seems nnneae~sary. 
cm!PTER V 
Senatorial Justice and a New Era 
A national financial crisis--Cpngress severely criticized--
Opposition to Johnson unabated--Cost of the Congressional plan-
-Publio opinion and impeachment--Senatorial justioe--A party 
problem--An attempt to control the Supreme Court--Acquittal of 
Johnson--A new era. 
our seventeenth President rose to power through the success 
of one assassin and the failure of another. Booth removed Lin-
coln, while his accomplice, Atzerodt, failed to eliminate 
Johnson, and the result was a Tennessee Democrat elected on a 
Union Party ticket, attempting to deal with a Republican Con-
gress. If the immediate cause of his accession was assassina-
tion, then a more remote and significant one is the Baltimore 
Convention held on June 7, 1864, where the Republican Party 
made an effort to unite antagonistic sections to save an elec-
tion. 
Lincoln realized that a Union sentiment required a Union 
Party, and to complete this idea he sent General Daniel Sick-
les to investigate the war record of Andrew Johnson with the 
1 
idea of placing him on the ticket if acceptable. Although it 
is obvious that a Tennessee candidate would probably have been 
an advantage, yet from the standpoint of polities there was 
another very real reason why Johnson was finally nominated. 
The fundamental motive at this point was the removal of Will-
iam H. Sewazd from the cabinet to make way for Daniel s. Dick-
inson. The New York delegation brought about Johnson's nomina-
2 
• tion at Baltimore to save Se~4. This defeated Sumner of 
1. Robert w. Winston, Andrew Johnson, Plebeian and Patriot, 
lew York, 1928, p. 254. 
2. Ibid., P• 256 • 
............ 
.. 2-
3 
Massachusetts whose intention it was to oust Seward, and may 
be looked upon as a definite basis of antagonism between John-
son and Sumner when the two clashed later. 
Loyal Republican journals of 1864 emphasize the lack of wis-
dom in changing during a crisis, and a universal belief in the 
capacity of A~raham Lincoln. !he Washington Chronicle said, 
"lhe Presidency came to him by a apeoial Jrovidence, and he 
4 
has moved in the right path from the beginning"; and again, 
"He has shown the devotion of washington and the energy of 
5 
Jackson". General opinion in the North acclaimed him"as a man 
in the chair more universally acceptable by all odds, than ~ 
6 
could hope to elect from without", and tended to believe that 
7 
"God meant Lincoln for President or the nation is deceive4". 
Democratic opinion varied from this idea in maintaining that 
"it was not even necessary to hold a Convention, for Mr. Lin-
coln had long since re-nominated himself. Now that he has ao-
8 
cepted, the farce of his nomination ends". Even though the 
stress of war days was sufficient to elicit some degree of 
united action, it was not powerful enough to remove sectional-
ism, and the Democrats saw little hope in placing their confi-
3. George F. Milton, The tfe of Hate, New York, 1930, p. 37. 
4. The Washington Chronic e, Jan. 2, 1864. Washington D.C. 
5. !bid., Jan. 2, 1864. 
6. ~ChiC!§O Daily Tribune, Jan. 5, 1864. Chicago, Illinios. 
7. Ibid. 
8. ~Chicago Times, May 2, 1864. Chicago, Illinois. 
-3-
dence in a new administration because it included a Tennessee 
candidate. 
It was a very natural and necessary thing that the u.nton 
should be emphasized in this campaign. Harpers Weeklz said,"If 
M%. Lincoln is re-elected, the union, the authority of the gov-
ernment, and the na-tional honor will be maintained uneondition-
9 
ally". It must not be assumed:~ that Lincoln carried the ticket 
through in 1864 with overwhelming influence, and that Johnson 
merely rode to victory on the strength of the President's pop-
ular! ty. 
A later historian has written, "There were many men in 1864 
who believe4 that the war was a mistake, and that Lincoln was 
.. 10 
a failure." In the ultimate preservation of the Union, Johnson 
was the man who felt the effects of this 4issatisfaotion. Since 
the days when the Constitution was made, sectionalism had mani-
fested itself perhaps stronger in New England than in any other 
part of the United States. The same political expediency which 
would secure New England support for a Tennessee Democrat as 
Viae-President would likewise make him unacceptable as a Pres-
ident. 
Without moralizing regarding slavery,it is impossible to 
disregard this side of the question, since it was emphasized 
9. Harpers Weekly, Sept. 10,1864. New York. 
10. Frederic L. Paxson, The New Nation, 
camo~!dge Massachusetts, 1919, p.3. 
particularly in New England by such speakers as Henry Ward 
Beecher, Edward Everett Hale, and the more radical Wendell 
Phillips. Some writers maintained it to be "no moral issue at 
all that impelled our government to take up arms. The only 
question was a civil one. War sprung alone from a civil ne-
ll 
oessity of maintaining constitutional authority~ The South 
was equally conscious of a letter sent to the Governor of 
Kentucky in which Lincoln had stated: " I am naturall7 ant~­
slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot 
12 
remember when I did not so think and feelt' Then if " the reb.-
els went to war in order to win an unfettered and unlimited 
13 
richt of extending slavery" it is obvious that the Northern 
moralists could make a big issue out ot this. In a republican 
form of government these issues reached·their climax in the 
activities of the people's representatives. Meanwhile, the 
work of 1864 is more concerned with the two leaders of the 
nation than with Senators and Representatives. 
Prior to the nomination, a journal in Lexington, KentuGky, 
made the remark that " Mr. Lincoln will be nominated without 
opposition, while Hannibal Hamlin is the most likely candidate 
14 
for Vice-President. The leas!_likely would be Andrew Johnsont' 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
The 
The 
The 
Tlie 
New York TimesT December 6, 1864, New York City. 
Chicago Dailir ribune, April 20, 1864. 
Washinfton c onicle, April 21, 1864. 
Lexlng on observer and Reporter, June 8, 1864, 
Lexington, Kentucky. 
I 
-~-
Even lhe Chicaco Daily Tribune,later to be such an enemy of 
the Vice-President, admittet that " he{Johnson) has inherited 
traits o~ good characte%, an unusual strength of native talen 
15 
sound common sense, indomitable courage and honesty~ MZ. L1n-
ooln gave more reasons in a letter written March 26, 1863,why, 
"few men in Congress have exerted in the beginnin& of the war 
so decided an influence •pon public opinion in the North as 
did Mr. Johnson. His oonduot as military governor of Tennessee 
in no way diminished his popularity, and won him ardent admir-
16. 
era in every loyal State". 
In 18il Johnson had been recognized as a Democrat, an4 as 
a s•pporter of all the leading measures of the Democratic Par-
ty. In 1860 he had favored the nomination of Breckenridge and 
Lane and had given his support to that ultra-Democratic ticke 
This was not a point to stress in 1864, but it was one to ex-
plain. A Washi~ton paper answered it by saying, " .Andrew 
Johnson supported Breckenridge for President in 1860 in the 
honest belief that he was speaking the wishes of his oonstit-
17 
uentsf Perhaps this was a good political statement making 
the effort to emphasize Johnson's loyalty, but it was not 
enough to satisfy later opponents who claimed him to be a 
traitor to bis party. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
The Chicaio Dailf ~ribune, July 9,1864. 
char!es n. lodar=ai, tlnooln's Plan of Reconstruction, 
lew York, 1961, p. 33. 
The Washington Chronicle, June 16, 1864. 
!he first signs of reconstruction had already appeared 
upon the horizon when Char~es sumner advanced his idea that 
the rebel states had ceased to exist. Reverdy Johnson of Mary-
land struck a salient point when he remarked that n this makes 
18 
lehnson an alien enemy~. This idea did not become prevalent 
until after the election was over but it is significant to 
see its oriein here in 1864 and late• watch it develop into a 
severe strucgle between President and Congress. 
Southern opinion at times went so far as to maintain that 
the Vice-Presidential candidate was a traitor to his party 
and guilty of apostaoy. The Lexington Observer and Reporter 
said, "Of all the men named, we should have preferred Johnson 
as Vice-Presidential nominee. Odious to the true union men of 
his own party and state, enjoyine neither confidence nor re-
19 
spect, he will prejudice even the nominee for President". The 
heat of war time tended to give Johnson, as a former military 
governor, additional political prestige despite this argument, 
and of course the absence of southern voting was likewise 
essential. 
Reconstruction was sufficiently developed as a plan to 
have it broucht into the campaign of 1864. The Chicago Times 
11. Ibid., June 21, 1864. 
19. The texi!§ton Observer and Reporter, June ll, 1864. 
believed " Mr. Lincoln's plan of reconstruction is fairly 
illustrated by the appointment o~ delegates to the Baltimore 
Convention from South Carolina. The next step will be to have 
the same people who elected them vote for Presidential elect-
ors for South Carolina. It is by this means that MZ. Lincoln 
20 
proposes to re-elect himselfw. Of course such interpretations 
could be expected from a Democratic paper during an election, 
but the above statement is a aic,n of the times and is only 
one phase of irritation and opposition to Lincoln's ideas on 
reconstruction. 
Hearkening back to the days of Jefferson, fhe New York 
Tribune hit upon the " majority-rule" idea and made " acqui-
escence in the decision of a majority the vital principle of 
n 
Republics". Mr. Lincoln's idea of " one-tenth" was thus 
struck boldly in a way that could easily create unnecessary 
prejudice by adhering to maxims at the expense of human neces-
sity during a crisis. One of the chief objections then in the 
North was based on the ground that it is violative of the 
principle laid down in organic law to follow the Lincoln plan; 
22 
that above all, ~jorities shall rule". Next in the line of 
criticism came a hint of Congressional power in the process. 
The opposition to Johnson seemed quite eager to show that he 
20. !he Chic!fo Times, May 31, 1864. 
21. The lew ~rk tribune, November 19,1864. 
22. The 'ashlncton chionicle, U&zch 12, 1864. 
was bzeakinc the fundamental eonstitutional principles of our 
government, and this argument soon became a political neoessit 
in building up Congressional powe~. 
It was feared that the rebel states would be ~elieved of 
military rule too soon and returned to their old position in 
the Union. To avoid such a eontingency it was declared that 
"neither the President nor Congress, singly, can do the work 
neoessa~y to suoh restoration. There must be conJoint action 
23 
between the President and COD&'ress". The Atlantic Monthll 
advocated a plan fo~ taking care ot the South by sending 
" armies of freemen into that area to secure the necessar1 
24 
one-tenth vote". Then follows a long explanation concerning a 
total lack of the desire for venCeance on the part of the 
North except perhaps as was necessary in a few individual 
oases. Men of considerable influence in thei~ day and who were 
writing, speaking, and helping to form public opinion, became 
possessed of the idea of a Northern C~usade. Edward Everett 
Hale thought the histo~y of all times definitely p~oves that 
" Northern invasions, when aucoesstul, advance the civiliza-
25 
tion of the world". Puritanism gave vent to the Biblical 
plan and hoped the North would " do in the South what Abraham 
-' 
23. ~he New Yo~k Times July 11, 1864. 
24. The lt!antlo Montify, Feb~uary, 1864. 
25. Ibll. 
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did in Canaan". After a time, Western papers followed in the 
same type of crusade against the South, and it is difficult to 
see anything but grim determination to demand an absolute 
change in social, political and economic life. 
New England sermons may quite fairly be represented by the 
activities of Henry ward Beeoher. On November 14, 1864, 1<1:r. 
Beecher advocated an idea which was to bear fruit later. He 
said, " Europe is made up of conquered provinces, whose people 
are contented and whose place in the world is still a powerful 
27 
one". In the hands of !haddeus Stevens this plan for recon-
structing the southern states became so powerful as to hinder 
any kind or sympathetic attitude. But Mr. Beecher concluded 
that there was a cheerful future despite present submissions 
and that in ten years the South would have nothinc to complain 
88 
of and " would celebrate the destruction of slavery". 
The campaign of 1864 accentuated the feeling of plebeian 
versus aristocrat and glorified an Illinois rail splitter with 
his colleague, a Tennessee tailar, over against an aristocrat-
ic South. Evidently the predominance of Southern men before th~ 
war was quite prominent in many minds of the North, and charts 
were printed in papers there to show how many offices this 
26. Ibid. 
27. The lew York Tribune, November 14, 1864. 
28. !bid. 
-
-10-
section had held in the old days. " The chairman of almost 
every important committee of both House and Senate had former-
29 
ly been a Southern slaveholder", and the most complete power 
is shown in suoh offices as Speaker of the Rouse, Secretary 
of State and Supreme Court Justices. " But henceforth the Free 
30 
States will guide the destinies of this Republic". 
More licht may be thrown on the attitude towards the South 
by realizing the underlying hatred of some Southern institu-
tions. The Washington Chronicle maintained that, "it is too 
late in the day to repeat the stereotyped gasconade of invul-
31 
nerable and invincible Southern chivalry". The Chic!io Daill 
Tribune remarked that, " Where there is an aristocracy estab-
lished3~y law it is necessary there should also be an inferior 
class". An example of the intermixture of slavery, sectional-
ism and hatred may be clearly shown in statements from fhe 
........... 
Chicago Daily Tribune. "If it were not for the corrupting 
influence of slaver7, the people of the South as well as those 
of the North would all be swa7ed by a noble sentiment of union 
33 
as one people". A few days later this same noble sentiment of 
union gave expression to a new fee•ing which revealed the idea 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
The washipgton Chronicle. January 2, 1864. 
Ibid. 
!h14., April 1, 1864. 
The Ohic:fo Dail~ Tribune, January l, 1864. 
tb14., Fe ruary , 1864. 
-11-
1 
that the " South acts fzom feeling and the Nozth from princi-
ple, hence the South is often eager and rash. When t~e south-
erner is whipped he is accustomed to giving up; so he will now 
34 
Let the government make its calculations and act accordingly". 
Reconciliation is a wonderful thing, but it is difficult to 
see how a genuine Southerner could take open insult, lose his 
self-respect and still receive Northern plans of reconstruc•-
tion freely and successfully. 
Accozding to the press, the mass of men in the North fa-
vored Lincoln. " We have a man at the helm in whom the masses 
repose great faith. The country has a certainty in Abraham 
35 
Lincoln for he has been ~ried and proven to be pure gold". 
Harpers Weekly . held up his personal character as the " rook 
upon which the opposition is wreokedr and believed the " pro-
found confidence of the great mass of the people was still un-
36 
brokeh". The accentuation of plebeian principles and the heat 
of civil war were both highly conducive to this attitude and 
one wonders what the opinion concerning Johnson was as public 
favor rose for Lincoln. One significant idea expressed before 
the election shows this quite well and is in itself a prophecy 
of events to coae. " If Mr. Lincoln be re-elected, and by his 
decease M%. Johnson should become President, there would be as 
34. Ibid., February 11,1864. 
35. !Dtl., February 27,1864. 
36. Harpers Weekly October 15, 1864. 
true and tried a Union man in the chair as if the President 
37 
had lived". Political power was working too muQh at this time 
to really allow very many papers to print editorials against 
the President. war conditions explain part of this, and there-
fore it is fairly certain that the mass of people were ready 
to support the administration. 
However this same mass of people inevitably came to the 
place where it was necessar~ to send representatives to Con-
gress and at that point an opportunity for trouble arose. 
First of all, the primary system threw power into the hands of 
political leaders who could plan affairs far in advance of 
public opinion. Secondly, it was recognized and admitted that 
the primary system was the real cause for sending inferior 
men to represent the people. !he New York Tribune said, " It 
is a solemn fact that we do not send so able men to Congress 
as we did some forty to sixty years ago; our detestable sys-
38 
tem of primary meetings and nominations are the main cause". 
While there need be no discussion here as to the relative 
merits and power of the legislative and executive branches of 
our government, it is at least essential that Congress shall 
not be looked upon as a panacea for national ills durinl 
times of stress when direct action is needed. But already 
37. Ibid., October 8, 1864. 
38. !he New York Tribune, July i, 1864. 
--
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manY were advocating that Presidential action be not too 
speedy, because Con&ress must be looked to if a substantial 
39 
agreement was to be reached. 
Negro suffrage makes its first appearance as a possible 
issue in the early part of January, 1864, and the opinion was 
voiced by the ardent sponsor of this campaign in later days, 
The Chicago Daily Tribune. " The black people are working into 
the raaks of recognized humanity and are without a doubt to 
40 
take care of themselves as if their skins were white". Four 
million freedmen offered almost unlimited opportunities for 
political development so it is little wonder that national 
needs were held in abeyance while exploitation was carefully 
planned. 
No time was wasted in starting criticism of the war admin-
istration after the first hope of peace arose. Some claimed 
the Northern people had formed erroneous ~udgments from the 
very beginning. For example, Lincoln had called for seventy-
five thousand men to start a campaign against a territory one-
41 
half as large as the whole of Europe. In 1863 a day of 
thanksgiving was held in commemoration of the " flnal and 
39.The New York Times, July 11, 1864. 
40.Tlie dliicago Dilly Tribune, January 5, 1864. 
4l.The chicago Times, February 18, 1864. 
permanent deliverance of East Tennessee, while exactly two 
months later General Longstreet was in possession of the same 
42 
territory". Democratic Journals looked upon the President as 
43 
" A second Washington and a smutty joker", or a " blundering 
44 
intermeddler in the affairs of the army". It was said of 
General Grant that he had three opponents durin£ the campaign 
of Richmond;" The rebel army, New York press and a President-
45 
hunting administration". Rebel and Copperhead opinion thus 
rose quite high in the campaign of 1864 even in parts of the 
:North. 
Cabinet proceedings were certainly not entirely harmonious 
during 1864 if general indications from the press can be re-
lied upon. Southern opinion declared Stanton and Halleck to be 
46 
"an incubus upon the management of military matters", and 
47 
looked upon them both as "notoriously unfitted" for their 
offices. But true to the "Old Jeffersonian doctrine, few men 
4S 
die and none resign while holding office". The New York Times 
thought it " very likely" that w some changes in the cabinet 
would conduce to the good of the country", but did not think 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibi(., Februart 25, 1864. 
44. tbld •• Ka7 8, 18i4. 
45. !he Lexiyton Observer and Reporter, July 23, 1864. 
ii. onn 
17. Ibid. 
!~: Qi!iew York 'l!1mes, AU8Ust 11, 1864. 
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it was wise at all to begin with the war Department. Later in 
the year when turthe~ agitation created more discussion the 
same pape~ remarked that "neithe~ the President nor the coun-
50 
try would assent to Stanton leaving office". There was onl7 
one way !or the country to express its opinion in an authori-
tative manner and that was by its representatives. Since the 
president is himself a representative of the people then the 
question arises as to what would happen if he disagreed with 
congress 1n re.ard to cabinet officers. This question is more 
tully developed in 1865. 
People were looking to Congress for " calmness, decision 
51 
and precision in the legislation of the winter of l864f 
Some thouaht that the new administration would even win South-
52 
ern opinion and induce a return to " Constitutional Rule". It 
is quite significant to note the idea that if the election 
depended upon the conduct of the war there would be a large 
measure of doubt as to iis outcome. Already the aftermath of 
Union Party activities became apparent as each side attempted 
to regain its status in time fo~ Congressional elections. 
The year 1864 marks a general beginning of movements whose 
power was not completed until a few years later. It is quite 
doubtful as to whether Lincoln's war administration would 
50. The New York Times, November 18, 1864. 
51. Maipers Week!~, December 17, 1864. 
52. The lew York imes, November 18, 1864. 
-16-
1 
have made him very popular a~ter public opinion had been cul-
tivated to think different!~. Criticism was growing stronger 
as 1865 approached. Although most people were apparently still 
in support of the administration, yet it is certain that there 
was an undercurrent of adverse opinion which was determined 
to be recognized when opportunity arose. 
-1:7-
CHAPrER II 
Lincoln's Civil War administration has been characterize4 
1 
as a " Presidential Dictatorship•, although in using such 
power he is said to have shown " a better combination of 
temperament, conviction, and ability to grapple with a compli-
cation like that in which this country was involved than any 
2 
man in the history of our nation". Whatever forces were work-
ing against him had as yet failed to shake the confidence of 
the people. Time has given present day views of this situation 
a better perspective and has opened the memoirs of men who 
were not in favo~ of Lincoln. After all, perhaps the press 
leads us to see the nationalist view or 'the people' too much 
as an aggregate. When the problem of reconstruction oame up 
for final solution the man who inherited Lincoln's cabinet 
ant\ who followed his plan found to his regret that 'the people 
meant very little in comparison with a rather small group of 
legislators. 
George w. Julian of Indiana belonged to that group, and Mr. 
Julian at least gives us an indication of the trend of feel-
ing which was to be characteristic of the Radicals." Of the 
more earnest and thorough-going Republicans in Congress 
probably not one in ten favore~inooln, and "during the 
l.William A. Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruct 
ion, New fo~k, 1898, p. 14. 
2. Harpers weekly, February 25, 18o5. 
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month of June, 1864, the feeling beeame more and more bitter 
and intense against Mr. Linooln, although its expression 
3 
never found its WJJ.y to the people". :M:r. Julian there tore olear-
ly states the fact that this group feeling was quite powerful 
long before Johnson's aoceseion, and secondly, that it was not 
in the minds of the general public. George F. Milton adds that 
"Sumner, Chase, Butler, Wade, Tremont, and Davis sought deeper~ 
ately to pre.an1 Lincoln's renomination", while the pocket 
4 
veto of the Wade-Davis bill increased their wrath. The Chicago 
Daill Tribune believed that ~e ~uld have more influence over 
the administration during the next four years than he has had 
5 
during the past". Whatever hatred had arisn, it was admitted 
by those who were not among his admirers and who believed "a 
stronger man oould have been selected for President" that "his 
6 
death now would be a calamity". This statement was made in 
Maroh, 1865, and shows a lurking fear whieh tended to hole 
support for Lincoln until the orisis was over. 
Andrew Johnson was inaugurated on the mbrning of April 15, 
and "was at once surrounded by radieal and conservative poli-
7 
ticians". Julian says there was a political caucus most of 
3. George w. Julian, Political Recollections, Chicago, 1884. 
p. 243. 
4. Milton, p. 168. 
5. The Chio~o Dailt Tribune, April 14, 1865. 
6. The New ork Trl une, Mirch 17, 1865. 
7.Ju!1an, p. 255. 
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the afternoon, "held for the purpose of considering the necess-
ity of a new cabinet and a line of policy less conciliatory 
8 
than that ot Mr. Lincoln". "And while everybody was shocked at 
Lincoln's murder, the feeling was nearly universal that the 
9 
accession of Johnson would prove a Godsend to the country". He 
concludes this radical outburst by declaring the reconstruct-
ion policies of Lincoln to be "as distasteful as possible to 
10 
Radical Republicans". 
The day following l~. Johnson's inauguration, Gideon Welles 
was invited to Edwin M. Stantonts priYate office for a confer-
ence. Mr. Welles reports in his diary that he had not been 
there long when Charles Sumner, together with several Massa-
chusetts politicians, came to the office. Mr. stanton immedi-
ately took from his desk the copy of a plan for Southern re-
11 
construction and read it before the group. Apparently, matters 
were taking definite form prior to Johnson's accession. 
southern people began to fear the new President, and ex-
pres$ed more faith in Lincoln as "a man of remarkable endow-
ments". Johnson was feared because "he was understood to be 
less generous in his views", and this "rendered the whole 
a. Ibid. 
9. !'61'Q. 
10. -rord. 
11. Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. II. New York, 1911. p. 291. 
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12 
dreadful af~air still more mysterious". The knowledge now at 
hand concerning the Radical plans would certainly tend to dis-
prove Greeley's statement in the New York Tribune that "we 
feel a growing confidence that his administration will prove 
13 
efficient, successful, and popular". Nor is it likely that all 
the people held much confidence in the idea of "one emotion in 
every true American heart, and that is the most inflexible de-
14 
termination to support President Johnson". 
Perhaps The New York Times strikes the idea of American in-
stitutions best in asking people to remember that "it is im-
possible for any one man to be indispensable to the preserva-
tion of our Union", while in u.. Johnson as a successor, the 
nation felt it had "a man of courage, sound judgment and pa-
15 
triotism" who had "stood the test of the most terrible trials~ 
Even Secretary McCulloch did not believe there was any dis-
16 
trust or radical upheaval in the cabinet until the year 1866. 
The President's first message seemed to please all of them, 
1'1 
and "none mol'e heartily than Mr. Stanton". It is a little won-
der that the mass of men in America did not realize the Rad-
ioal force in opposition to the Pl'esident, when the variation 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
The Lexington Observer and Re~orter, April 19, 1865. 
The iew Yol'K Tribune, April 2 , 1865. 
Harpel's Weeki~, April 29, 1865. 
The New Yol'kimes, April 17, 1865. 
Hugh McCUlloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century, 
Ibid,, p. 391. lew !ork, 1888. p.39!. 
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of opinion between Welles and MoCullooh is so great, while 
both of them were active in the oa.binet, and had first hand 
impressions of aotual conditions is Washington. 
sorrow for the murdered President turned into more bitter-
ness toward the South, and the results hardly agree with the 
sentiment expressed in his last inaugural of ~alice toward 
18 
none" and "charity for all". Opinion easily turned to the 
19 
"real murderers whose aotion brought the Civil War", and this 
necessarily meant the Southern leaders as well as those who 
had supported them. This vindictive attitude, of course, de-
manded "that Juatioe be meted out, and Justice demands .that 
treason shall be treated as a crime for which the leaders 
. 20 
shall be_punished". The President was desoribed as one who was 
"characterized by his severity toward all enemies of the gov-
ernment" and to whom "a traitor was an infamous wretoh to be 
21 
detected and executed". 
The amnesty proclamation of May 29, 1865, was the real be-
ginning of reconstruction work under the new President. In the 
opinion of some, "it seemed in every respect deserving of ap-
22 
proval". H~pers Weekly gives a good idea of its general re-
ceptinn in confessing that it -would be better pleased with 
18. 
19. Atlantic Monthlf, July 1865. 
20. ike chlo!io Datil Tribune, April 18, 1865. 
21. ~: e conneotlou erila' April 18' 1865. New Haven, Conn. 
22. !bl4., May 31, 18S5. 
-
-~2-
the plan if it did not receive such unqualified c~mmendation 
23 
from those who have most savagely denounced President Johnson~ 
On May 12, a caucus of Republicans was held in Washington 
nto consider measures for saving the new administration from 
24 
the conservative control which threatened it". Both Wade and 
sumner insisted that the President was in favor of negro suff-
rage and based their assertions upon the results of many pri-
vate conferences held with him. The Radical Julian introduced 
the usual appeal by declaring it to be "neither morally nor 
25 
logically possible to escape negro suffrage". A man who 
called Lincoln's assassination a "God-send to the country" now 
spoke from the standpoint of a logician and moralist in deal-
ing with political problems. Mr. Julian throws more light upon 
his views by adding in his "ReoOlleotions" that he now went 
back to Indiana to determine the attitude of his constituents. 
Northern newspapers of several cities were now practically 
ready to follow such a campaign for negro suffrage. The New 
York Times thought it "far better that Grant had surrendered 
27 
to Lee than that the negro should not be allowed to vote". 
The Nation believed by denying negro suffrage "in a country 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26t 
27. 
-
Hariers Weekl~, June 17, 1865. 
JUl an, p. 26 • 
Ibid. 
!bla. Tne New York Times, June 10, 1865. 
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where men who are denied enjoyment of political .rights ue. de-
nied everything belonging to manhood, we would make ourselves 
. 28 
foolish every time we talked about Democratic principles". 
so the caucus had negro suffrage as its primary obJect, and 
clearly shows the determination of Radical lea4ers to force 
this issue upon the President. 
Signs of opposition to the Radical pla.n of suffrage came 
when Andrew Johnson made a.n address on May 25, 1865, in which 
he said he was· "in favor of leaving the question of suffrage 
of colored persons to a decision of the loyal white residents 
29 
of the South". Sumner on the same night practically admitted 
what was planned, or at least prophesied what would happen, by 
remarking that "Liberty has been won, but the battle of equal-
30 
ity is still pending". The Baltimore Sun was a champion of 
the President's attitude a.nd maintained that he was only giv-
ing to the people of the s-tates the rights guuanteed when our 
31 
government was founded. During June, Northern journals 
claimed that the President "desires to see the negroes of the 
32 
South invested with power of self-protection by the ballot". 
It is apparent that much of the situation now centered about 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
The Nation, July 27, 1865. New York. 
Tne Baltimore Sunt May 27, 1865, Baltimore, Maryland. 
!bid., June 5, 18 5. 
!6!'a". 
The Connecticut Herald, June 10, 1865. 
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suffrage, and even though the press as a whole upheld Johnson, 
yet his failure to assist in giving the ballot to the negro 
~uld immediately endanger his position in the public eye. 
Virginia had an organized government under Governor Francis 
pe±rpont, which had carried over from Lincoln's t~rm. On May 
9, Johnson recognized this government, and thereby tended to 
antagonize certain leaders. Oberholtzer feels that the "Negro-
33 
philes" already feared a change in the President by this time. 
Thaddeus Stevens wrote to Sumner immediately following the 
recognition of the Peirpont government asking if there might 
be a way "to arrest the insane course of the President in re-
34 
organization". First indications of a change in the press 
occurred on July 10, 1865, when The Chicago Daily Tribune 
claimed the Lincoln-Johnson policy would produce nothing but 
35 
"shame and disaster". Lincoln's plan as followed by his suc-
cessor was becoming unacceptable. 
Editorial opinion in the South could have helped to create 
a good impression in the North if the editors would have re-
alized how much was to depend on the attitude shown by the 
leaders of the South. Instead of this, however, we read indi-
cations in private letters of this period showing the real 
situation. A chaplain in the Uni~army who had served in 
33. 
34. 
35. 
Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, History of the United States, 
Vol. f: p. 41. 
Ibid. 
The Chicago Triiune, July, 10, 1865. 
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Virginia during the war wrote to Judge J. D. Davidson of Lex-
ington, Virginia, in 1865, as follows; "I have had many friends 
invite me to Virginia, promising me the best meal of hominy 
and milk I could desire. But your papers and editors look dis-
36 
couraging". Another letter written June 1, 1865, desoribes 
conditions in Staunton, Virginia, and vicinity. "We are in the 
dark here and do not discover a way of coming to light. We have 
no newspapers from the North except those that occasionally, by 
chance, get through. I send you but one Richmond paper--it is 
37 
all we can raise since our ears run only tri-weekly". rt is 
evident that many people in the South must have been uninformed 
about affairs in their own area, to say little of the country 
as a whole; and most of the material that was circulated came 
from anti-Northern journals. The Lexington Observer and Repor-
ter made some rash statements about this time. mr.henever the 
.......... 
people of Kentucky desire to get rid of slavery, they will do 
so in their own way, but will take oare not to meddle with the 
property of their neighbors. We will not willingly entrust the 
most delicate of our affairs to the 'appropriate legislation' 
38 
of Congress". 
36. Letter written by I. Moilwaine to Judge J.D. Davidson, 
Lexington, VIrginia, June 1, !865, in the Moeorm!ok His-
torical Society, Chicago, Illinios. Original letter. 
37. Ibid,, Mr. w. Frank to Judge Davidson. June 1, 1865. 
38. ~Lexington Observer an4 Reporter, March 25, 1865. 
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NewEngland had a good opportunity, in the faCJe of such re-
marks, to heap criticism upon the South, and The Connecticut 
Herald started the campaign. "Before Congress meets there will 
be a united North, demanding in a tone no Congress can disre-
39 
gard, the denial of all civil power to rebel states". Rad-
icals were also busy, and took advantage of such opinion to 
write directly to Johnson. Thaddeus stevens asked him to "hold 
40 . 
his hand and await the action of Congress". A definite break 
was not yet made, and we find The Chicago Daily Tribune approv 
41 
ing "some features of the President's plan". The main object-
ion still held was regar4ing Preeidential action as final "pri-
42 
or to its endorsement by Congress and the people". Harpers 
Weekly held the idea that "Johnson initiated action and con-
gress completes it,- a principle all loyal men of the union 
43 
will certainly heartily endorse". Furthermore, this journal 
maintained that "there was nothing in the acts or words of 
Johnson to Justify the insinuation that he wishes to intrust 
44 
political power to the late rebels", and that the only loyal 
45 
thing to do was to "patiently wait". 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
The connecticut Herald, August 1, 1865. 
Oberholtzer, Vol. v. p. 41. 
The Chicago Tribune, September 23, 1865. 
rbta. 
Har_!ers Weeklt, July 22, 1865~ 
Ibl ., Septem er 2, 1865. 
Ibid., September 30, 1865. 
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A gradual restoration of the southern states became more 
impossible because the problem became primarily a political 
one, and negro voting was the issue over which this was ulti-
mately !ought out. In March, 1865, a southern paper had said; 
"the political and social equality of the negro is the object 
46 
aimed at by the Radicals of our last Congress". Then a few 
months later, Northern journals were conjecturing as to just 
how long it would require for negroes to be prepared for citi-
zenship. It was thought "these four million loyal citizens 
could be educated speedily under competent officers, and then 
47 
go out to put down brigandage and preserve social order". Over 
against this extreme radicalism it was urged upon the people 
to be patient and not "expect the South to be thorough-going 
abalitionists and advocates of negro suffrage", simply because 
48 
they had been defeated in the ~. It was beginning to be evi 
dent to many by this time that the suffrage question was di-
verting attention from more vital issues of human need, and 
The Baltimore Sun openly accused Wilson and Sumner of acting 
49 
"for partisan expediency", and defied these leaders to prove 
they never had favored the use o! federal power in determining 
matters relating to suffrage in their own state. 
46. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, March 22, 1865. 
47 •. ~1!ie dhlojto Tribune, April 26, 1865. 
48. The Bait more Sun~ June 16, 1865. 
49. !bid., JUly 14, 1 65. 
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The people seemed disposed to await the progress of the ex-
perimental government then going on in the South and leave the 
final deeision until later. It was agreed upon by most editors 
50 
"who in reality lead public opinion", that "not one among the 
distinguished opponents of President Johnson ever states that 
51 
Abraham Lincoln's policy would have been different"• Press 
opinion steadily worked on the idea that Congress must be con-
sulted, and many editors traced governmental growth to show 
the absolute necessity for caution in the use of Presidential 
power. Therefore, when Congress convened on December 4, 1865, 
it is quite certain that some of the members had definite 
plans made contrary to the Lincoln-Johnson policy. Even though 
the people did seem disposed in the beginning to await the re-
sults of experimental government, the fact remains that their 
representatives theoretically expressed public opinion by de-
manding an entirely new plan. 
While main issues were being brought up, the leader of our 
nation met regularly with a cabinet seleoted by his predecess-
or. ~uestions of reconstruction came up here, and any direct 
antagonism or opposition to Presidential policy in the cabinet 
would undoubtedly work for t~ouble. Gideon Welles, Secretary 
of the Navy, indicates in Bebruary, 1866, that a clique. in 
50. The washinfton Chronicle, September 24, 1865. 
51. Ibid., Sep ember 28, 18&5 • 
,. 
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opposition to the administration, with Henry Winter Davis as 
leader, had erown up in Washington. "Secretary Stanton is on 
terms with these men, and to some extent gives them oounte-
52 
nanoe even in their war upon the President". It is well to 
keep in mind here that t~ factions were plainly in action in 
Lincoln's ~&binet before his death. Then when Johnson came to 
power, Hugh McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury, says he re-
quested the O&binet members during the first session to stand 
by him in the crisis. "He appeared relieved when we assured 
him that while we felt it our duty to place our resignations 
in his hands, he should have the benefit of our services un-
53 
til he saw fit to dispense with themn. This verbal agreement 
seems sufficient evidence to lead one to think that the mem-
bers were willing to abide by Johnson's wishes, and to resign 
whenever he saw fit to demand it. It McCulloch's word is taken 
for it, "the first year's administration was cordially support 
54 
ed by every member of the Oabinet". 
Clear judgment concerning the actual progress of r~·­
struotion was clouded somewhat because of a lack of informa-
tion, or an abundance of misinformation. As a result, the 
press spends considerable time in the use of flowing phrases 
which did not bear directly upon human need, and which did not 
52. Welles, Vol. II, P• 247. 
53. McCulloch, p. 37&. 
54. Ibid. 
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correspond to the action in Congress. Such very obvious phrase 
as, "It is one of the most critical periods of our history, 
and the people will all rejoice if the President and Congress 
55 
should agree", make onewonder what the people were doing to 
make such a state of affaire come to pass. The Lincoln-Johnson 
plan was cons1dere4 to be "sanctioned by every consideration 
of national Justice and political expediency, and in spite of 
all fanatical or factious opposition in North or South it will 
56 
certainly prevail". Radical justification went the limit, and 
in the interest and supreme welfare of our nation "looked to 
the recuperation of the negro as far more hopeful than chang-
ing the old slave-holding class from the curse of wrong and 
57 
oppression they have been pursuing". Sectionalism, Puritanism 
and political expediency demanded something more than a mere 
return to the fold. 
Evidence has already been brought forth to indicate that 
prearranged plans were ready for operation when Congress assem 
bled on December 4, 1865. Some Cabinet members were doubtful 
supporters of the nation's chief and, unquestionably, several 
Congressional leaders were directly opposed to his plan. De-
spite all of this, there is evidence in several Northern pa-
pers that people were warned or the situation and later voted 
55. Harpers Weekly, october 14, 1865. 
56. The New York Times, october 11, 1865. 
57. The chicago bally Tribune, June 21, 1865. 
,. 
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direatly against supporting Johnson. The Philadelphia Ledger 
judged it was an understanding among majority leaders of cron-
58 
gress to refuse admission to "rebel states", and the Balti-
more Sun added that "the President's labor of love would go 
59 
tor nothing if this happens". At least a portion of the peop-
le in Northern States were in tavor of amnesty, but realized 
already that preconceived plans would most likely prevent it. 
Word from the South usually cast a cloud over hopes of am-
nesty, for there is little doube that people there were quite 
indiscreet in handling affairs while hatred was at such a high 
level. In an original letter written to Judge J.D~ Davidson of 
Lexington, Virginia, these words appear; "We e.re getting along 
as well as could be expected under militia rule---there are 
restrictions which are rather disagreeable, suoh as remaining 
indoors after dark, and doing nothing which looks like an in-
60 
sult to our fl&£"• Later in 1865, another letter WTitten to 
this same Judge Davidson describes the Congress. ~ell, this 
Yankee Congress is not doing us any good. The Lord only knows 
what will eome of it.--Great Godl we can't stand negro equality 
61 
in suffrage and our juries". 
58. The Baltimore Sun, November 23, 1865. 
59. !bid. 
60. Letter written to Judge J.D. Davidson, by N. Frank, Staun-
ton, Virginia., June 1, 1865. In the MeCormiall Historical 
Society, Chicago, Illinois. Original letter. 
61. Ibid., By F.J. Manay, December 8, 1865. 
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Most Radical papers used hasty action as a universal evil, 
and exploited such an idea to the limit to prevent public 
opinion from demanding that Johnson's plan be used. In order 
to prove the futility of depending upon Southern people, 
southern Black Codes were published. ~south Carolina passed 
stringent Black Codes, while Mississippi elected a Rebel Gov-
62 
ernor", said The Chicago Daily Tribune. ~Louisiana is on the 
down grade, while Georgia and Alabama show plainly that they 
63 
are not to be trusted~. The idea of reinstating eleven states 
of this type, according to the Radicals, was nothing short of 
64 
"political insanity". 
Probably the most difficult problem was to actually present 
evidence of genuine Southern conditions, because it is f'airly 
certain that such evidence passed through too much Congress-
ional Committee work to remain thoroughly accurate. Even if it 
had passed through in the original form, nothing short of pa-
tience and aanesty would have allowed these Southern people a 
chance. Perhaps private letters give us a good a view as any. 
One letter, written December 5, 1865, by a resi4ent of Shreve-
port, Louisiana, says, "I will give you a passing glance of 
this section of the country. In the first place, neither life, 
limb nor property is safe now, since the Yankees occupied this 
62. The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 29, 1865. 
63. !bid. 
64. !'61T. 
-
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place. One can form an idea of a country swarming with idle, 
dissolute, improvident negroes and garrisoned with negro troop 
Yankee cotton agents are having a good time; they seize upon a 
lot of private cotton and then offer to release it if the par-
ty will pay them a heavy bonus or divide.---This state of aff-
airs prevails not only in this section of the country, but in 
65 
many parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Texas". 
Evidence of Northern aggression or incompetence, and Southern 
disloyalty is about evenly balanced so far as communications 
are concerned. 
Among the more conservative elements of the North there was 
a general reeling at the close of 1865 that Congress and Pres-
ident would ultimately solve the problem together. Harpers 
Weekly was firm in the opinion that the Southern experiment 
was quite successful enough to see no reason for doubting its 
continuation. The washington Chronicle believed "Thaddeus ste-
vens will live to see the day when his gloomy predictions will 
pass away before a lasting peace. We cannot yield to his doo-
66 
trine of Conquered Provinces". 
Since the time when our Constitution was formed, there has 
been a controversy over fundaaental rights vested in the sev-
eral branches of the nation's government. "Already then, ~8C%O 
suffrage is reduced to a pra"Cf't-ioal necesai ty and practioal 
65. Letter written by D. Campbell, Shreveport, Louisiana, to 
Cousin James (Davidson), Lexington, Virginia. December 5, 
1865. Chio~o Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois. 
66.The Washington Chronicle, December 20, 1865 
r 
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wisdom". The reason given was, that since Johnson had pre-
scribed conditions for the South, then Congress, under the Con 
&titution, had the same right. This implied, evidently, that 
loyal negroes were necessary to create a loyal South, and 
thereby elect Congressmen who would support Congressional pow-
er. New Sngland, through The Connecticut Herald saw some hope 
for the South in "the infusion of new blood from the North and 
68 
the development of an enlightened South". Similar statements 
occurred ~uite often in several papers of the North. History 
has later shown what this Northern enlightenment proved to be, 
and letters of this same time clearly indicate conditions al-
ready in existence in 1865. The word exploitation is better 
suited as a descriptive term than enlightenment. 
aongressional action began in December, 1865, and with its 
advent, the New York press believed any one looking for a 
break between President and Congress would be "utterly dis-
69 
appointed". These editorial opinions went further astray in 
maintaining that "unless we are greatly mistaken, the American 
people will give Johnson such support as has never been ac-
corded to any Chief Magistrate since the days of Andrew Jaok-
70 
son". Indiaations of other developments were manifested when 
Congress proceeded without waiting for the usual Presidential 
67. The Connecticut Herald, June 30, 1865. 
68. Ibid., November 3o, 1865. 
69. The New York Times, November 25, 1865. 
70. Ibid., December 2&, 1865. 
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message. Radical papers excused this glaring omission by say-
ing it was done, "in all probability in fUll understanding 
71 
with the President". Gideon Welles thinks such understanding 
was not established, and furthermore, Johnson had sent Horace 
Maynard to prevent Steven's effort to have a Reconstruction 
committee appointed. Both sides at least understood that trou-
ble was approaching. Welles says Johnson told him the Recon-
struction Committee would be ~nocked in the head" by Maynard. 
He concludes his remarks on this subject by mentioning the 
fact that Congress also did not send the usual committee to 
inform Mr. Johnson of its organization. Welles thinks this was 
73 
not unintentional, but had a definite "design in it". 
At the close of 1865, direct attacks upon the President 
were still unpopular, and resented by the Northern press. This 
is shown bt criticism of Charles Sumner's speeches against 
Johnson in December, 1865. Sumner, who prided himself upon his 
dignity and poise, was accused of being "in very bad taste, to 
74 
asy the least", while scorning the President at this time. 
Oberholtzer says, "Whoever will follow the record of the fall 
and summer of 1865, cannot fail to form the opinion that the 
71. The Connecticut Herald, December- 4, 1865. 
72. Welles, Vol. II, P• 388 
73. Ibid. 
74. ~Nation, December 28, 1865. 
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president, throughout that time, labored with industry, tact, 
75 
and patriotism". Rhodes summarized the situation as follows:~ 
"The question was fairly before congress am4 the country; with 
the main bouy of Republicans in the House and Senate as the 
jury, Johnson was the advocate of one side, while Sumner and 
76 
stevens were on the other". 
Many editorials did not indicate that the whole question 
had resolved itself into a legal combat between President and 
Congress, as is indicated by The Washington Chronicle:- "If 
the South wishes to be fully restored to the Union and to en-
joy all the blessings whioh it affords, they have only to com-
ply with Congress and the President and the general policy of 
77 
our goverament". The actual Radical interpretation of this 
policy is stated by The Chicago Daill Tribune; "If there is to 
be any hanging back now against Constitutional Amendments, 
they will find negro suffrage at their doors by the unanimous 
78 
voice of the North". The Connecticut Herald thought "the Pres 
ident will not take strong ground either way, but will leave 
79 
the admission of Rebel States to the decision of Congress", 
Another newspaper said, "Neither the President nor the people' 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
Oberholtzer, Vol. v. p.l43. 
James Ford Rhodes, Histor~ of the United States, from the 
Compromise of IS o. New York, Vol. VI. '· 553. 
The Washington Chronicle, December 24, 1865. 
The chicago Tribune, November 14, 1865. 
The connecticut Her&.ld, Deoember 5, 1865. 
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representatives in Congress, if we understand their relative 
positions, have any other purpose in view but to bring baak 
the seaeded states on terms of perfeat equality with those who 
80 
have continued loyal to the Union". These statements, while 
yarying from one another somewhat, still show that people were 
led to think that the policy used would. be agreed upon by leg-
islative and exeautive departments together, and. certainly 
gave no indication of a battle between the two, with Congress 
as a jury. It is necessary to follow these issues on into 1866 
before an open break appears in the pub1ia press. 
so. The Washington Chronicle, Deaember 4, 1865. 
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CH.APTER III 
Intimate glimpses of politioal movements appear in the mem-
oirs of two Cabinet members, Welles ana McCulloch. On January 
8, 1866, L~. Welles reports, "!he President ana the Radioal 
leaders are not in direct conflict, but I see not how it is to 
l 
be avoided". McCulloch said, "he (Johnson) disagreed with 
congress (as his predecessor would have done had he lived) in 
regard to what should be required of the Southern States, but 
he was not the aggressor, and although his course was in some 
respects indefe~sible, he little merited the obloquy which was 
2 
heaped upon him". Day by day the relationship was becoming 
more strained, and Welles plainly indicates Stanton's turn to 
Radical policy, which gave a good connection for the Radicals 
in securing information, as well as blocking plans of Presi-
3 
dent Johnson. 
Henry J. Raymond, editor of The New York Times,was one 
friend of the President who started the year of 1866 with an 
open declar .. tion of support by claiming, "ndlthing is left to 
be compromised. The fact is, the work of restoration is nearly 
4 
complete". It seemed to him tha~ opposition to President Jo)n-
son's plans would be justifiable only insofar as it was not in 
harmony with Mr. Lincoln's plan, since the Northern people 
l. Welles, Vol. II. P• 412. 
2. McCulloch, p. 405. 
3. Welles, p. 424. 
4. The New York Timesz January 9, 1866. 
,. 
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gave Lincoln their support. !he newly organized Southern gov-
ernments were a part of Lincoln's plan, so the only logical 
thing to do was to recognize them. w~. Raymond was but one ot 
a minority group in the House, destined to be crushed by the 
opposition under the leadership of Thaddeus Stevens. 
Very little opportunity was lett for a President to exert 
honest effort and express individual ideas when a leAding West 
ern paper declared "if the President quarrels with Congress, 
it will be for the purpose of following in the footsteps of 
5 
his three apostate predecessors--Tyler, Fillmore, and Buchanan 
This opinion was carried to its conclusion in hoping for no 
trouble, and believing that no trouble would occur if the "act 
ing President" would confine himself to his legitimate func-
6 
tiona and not interfere in the business of Congress. Congress-
ional supremacy is uzged still further by New England editors 
who looked to Congress as a well-nigh perfect representation 
of the people. The Boston Transcript thought, "at no time 
since the adoption of the Constitution have the Senate and 
House so perfectly represented their constituencies. It be-
longs to Congress preeminately to settle the terms of recon-
7 
struction". The argument brought forth in behalf of such 
action included, first of all, a warning against hasty recon-
5. The Chic~o Daily Tribune, January 3, 1866. 
6. rbia. 
7. The Boston Transcript, January 12, 1866. Boston, .assaohu-
setts. 
r ________________________________________ ~ 
struction, and secondly, a reminder of Southern hatred, which, 
according to New England editors, was quelled only because the 
confederacy was unable to fight any longer. Then, even though 
the Southern States were not represented, it was thought that 
the North would oare for all local affairs, so nothing mote 
8 
was necessary from the standpoint of human need. 
In 1861. Johnson deolared in the u.s. Senate that no power 
existed anywhere to deolare a siate out of the union. He held 
the same &pinion in 1866, when Congress, under Sumner, stevens, 
9 
and their associates aimed to do that very thing. The group 
supporting Johnson called Congressional action a "Radical 
assault", whioh is in agreement with McCulloch's statements 
that Johnson was not the aggressor. The National Intelligen-
~ said, "!he people want reunion. The American masses, with 
10 
their President, are looking to Peace". There is little evi-
dence at this point to show Presidential inconsistency, al-
though there is considerable· to prove insurgent plotting 
against the administration. One thing may be stated for cer-
tain; Johnson was not a "drunken imbecile", as a Bishop stated 
a few years after his administration closed. This remark 
passed without rebuke, and was published without a comment in 
later years, which indicates the attitude of the American 
8. Ibid., January 25, 1866. 
9. The National Intelli~enoer, January 2, 1866. washington D.C. 
lO.Ibid., January 5, 18 6. 
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ll 
people toward their seventeenth President. 
Editoritls of The Chicago Daily Tribune denounced the South 
ern reconstruction policy under Johnson as nothing more than 
the return of a caste system "which distinguished the laws and 
12 
customs of the South". In the editorials of The Boston Tran-
script, which was said to be the organ of Charles Sumner in 
New England, Thaddeus stevens was held up as a champion of the 
people, beoause,,as that paper said, "in his fight he trusts 
to the people to sustain whatever is just and humane; and in 
13 
that trust feels assuzed, as well he may, of a final victory". 
To continue in Congress despite the absence of eleven states 
was no serious handicap in 1866, according to the Radicals. 
The Boston Transcript said, "the people are not under control 
of party demagogues or manners, but are voting and thinking 
for themselves. The majority in Congress are not ahead of the 
14 
wishes of their constituents". All of this evasion of issues 
and political writing simply will not bear the test of exper-
ience or the testimony of history. 
Andrew Johnson looked upon himself as the representative of 
all the American people. He had been consistent enough up to 
11. McCulloch, p. 407. 
12. The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 5, 1866. 
13. The Boston Transcrlp't, February 2, 1866. 
14. Ibid., february 16, 1866. 
--------------------------------------------------------------. 
this time to create the impression that he "represented a po-
15 
sition both politically and Constitutionally strong". From 
this time forward, criticism of his work began to take a more 
open form. No better examples of disregard for Presidential 
authority need be given than the attitude displayed by the 
opening of Congress in December, 1865. That group of leaders 
proceeded without waiting for a Presidential message, which 
was contrary to all established precedent. Thaddeus Stevens 
now went further on February 16, 1866, by adding, "we shall 
not trouble President Johnson by sending him this amendment 
(the Fourteenth), if it is passed by Congress, because it is 
1& 
not necessary to submit it to him for his approval". Such a 
statement was an open insult, and may be taken as one more in-
dication of Radical determination. The President had shown one 
significant change thus far, and that was a desire to recog-
nize the Southern State governments after he had opened his 
term of office with severe denunciations of the rebels. Rad-
icals interpreted this as traitorous activity rather than a 
genuine desire to rebuild the South, or at least they claimed 
to hold this view. 
On February 6, 1866, the seoond Freedmen's Bureau Bill was 
ready for the President's signature. This reorganized the for-
mer lureau and continued its activity as a means of oaring for 
15. The New York Times, February 14, 1866. 
16. Harpers Weekly, February 17, 1866. 
L 
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the South. February twentieth and twenty-first, 1866, were 
days of editorial outbursts throughout the country in answer 
to the veto of this Bill. One journal stated bluntly, "by this 
formal aot he has severed himself from the loyal party and 
17 
united with the enemy". His reason that it was not needed 
opened the way for criticism, because the first aat expired 
18 
May 1, 1866. This reason was called a Wpositively silly one", 
and also led to the more radical supposition that the Presi-
dent proposed to use the veto power now to prevent successful 
legislation until therepresentatives from the Southern States 
19 
were admitted. He now had made a stand that was definite 
enough to place him in open hostility to a Radical Congress. 
20 
Sumner's supporting journal looked wi~h "profound regret~ upon 
the veto, while The New York Times thought it was "not at var-
iance with either the majority or Congress or the country in 
21 
any essential point". The Bureau Bill provided for an oppor-
tunity of increased governmental activity and expenditure, and 
furthermore, had originated "solely as a war measure". It rep-
resented a form a form of government which was burdensome, and 
if the Presidential plan were carried through, there would 
22 
have been no justification for it. The National Intelligencer 
17. The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 21, 1866. 
18. Ibid. 
l9.rnl'i. 
20. The Boston Transcript, February 20, 1866. 
21. The New fork Times, Febr·uary 20, 1866. 
2~. The National Intelligenaer, February 17, 1866. 
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noped th&t, "even if the President signs it, his prudence and 
23 
diseretion may save us from some of its dangers". Therefore, 
we see some opinion strongly against the bill even before the 
veto, and after the veto, The New York Sun upheld Johnson by 
saying, "the veto is no sign at all that he has broken with 
24 
his party" • 
• 
While this was fresh in the minds of the people, 1lr. John-
son made a speech which cast more gloom over his prospeets of 
maintaining public opinion in support of his plan. In the ad-
dress he uttered many remarks of a somewhat undignified nature, 
and ended by mentioning the names of a few opponents, thereby 
openlJ committing himself against them. Thaddeus stevens, 
Charles Sumner, and Wendell Phillips were named as men who 
work acainst the fundamental principles of our government, and 
Johnson excited the boisterous merriment of the audience by 
calling John w. Forne7 "a dead duck" upon whom he "would not 
25 
waste his ammunition". This was a dangerous pastime because 
Mr. Forney was secretary of the Senate, and editor of The Wash 
ington Chronicle. That journal then turned against Johnson and 
fought him to the end, where&s it was quite friendly up to 
this time. Another noticeable change against the President is 
shown in that powerful New York publication, The Nation. The 
23. Ibid. 
24. !"6!Q., February 20, 1866. 
25. ~Schurz, Reminiscences, Kew York, 1907, Vol. III, p.22 
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February twenty-second speech (1866) left the situation in 
suoh a state that most Radicals looked upon the executive pow-
er now as a threat capable of delaying, but not preventing 
26 
congressional action. 
A regular campaign was inaugurated by Radical foroes pre-
paratory to forcing through a Freedmen's Bureau and a Civil 
Rights Bill. Among the Congressional supporters it was thought 
"all that loyal men need to do now is to fortify themselves 
against Johnson's attacks by passing such laws as shall leave 
27 
him powerless or remove him altogether". After such remarks 
as Johnson made on February 22, it was vain to look for any 
further cooperation of President and Congress, and his staunoh 
supporters stated that they were not surprised at a Radical 
campaign throughout the country because they "did not see how, 
as politicians, the Radicals could pursue any other course 
28 
than the one they had adopted". And above all things, these 
Congl'essmen wel'e politicians, so a deliberate attempt by the 
29 
President "to make them and their party odious" was answel'ed 
with an energetic campaign. It was also sarcastically proposed 
by ElL. Godkin that "a commission composed of conservative 
politicians be framed to en~uire by what authority Congress 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
The Boston Transcript, February 23, 1866, 
The chlcagi bali{ Tribune, February 23, 1866. 
The lew York Wor d, March 1, 1866. 
!bid. 
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30 
meddles in the government of this country at all~. It was cer-
tainly a matter of regret that Congress and the President 
should differ so decidedly at this i$portant moment, but it 
was very absurd now to expect, as Harpers Weekly did, that 
"Congress should take the initiative in returning to coopera-
31 
tion with the President". Mr. George William Curtis of Har-
pers Weekly thought this would be possible if Congressmen re-
ally studied the Constitution and saw the branches of govern-
ment in their proper aspects. He said, "The President is but 
a coordinate branch of the government. He is not the superior 
32 
of Congress or the Supreme Court". Whatever attitudes might 
have been taken, the fact remains that Radical forces scorned 
the very idea that Johnson had followed Lincoln's plan, and 
the press was filled with talk about this 'assault' for a week 
or more. Each side regarded the other as guilty of the origin-
al 'assault'. 
Using the first veto, together with the ~bruary twenty-
second speech as a basis, the opposition moved forward to exe-
cute the program of their •committee on Reconstruction' with 
a new spirit of mastery. The intense feeling of antagonism be-
came more aroused as some editors thanked the President for 
-
30. The Nation, March 8, 1866. 
3l.Har~ers Weiklz, March 10, 1866. 
32, Ib d,, Maioh 17, 1866. 
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nthe vigor and intelligence with which he called Congress to a 
sense of its duties, and for the pluck which has enabled him, 
more or less completely, to baffle the plans of the disunion-
33 
ists". Colonel Fornev was told nit would be utterly idle for 
him or anybody else to proseoute war upon the President" be-
cause it will be impossible to force suoh hatreds upon the 
H 
people".. most of the appeal to the people was necessarily 
based upon success in handling reorganized Southern States, to 
gether with the negro suffrage problem, so affairs hung in the 
balance until President or Congress could win a vote of confi-
dence. It may be too harsh to say that Johnson"was in a mood 
as bitter and defiant as that of the extremest Radical of the 
35 
Congressional maJority", or that "by aheer rashness and intem-
perance he forced the consolidation of the majority against 
36 
him", but it seems unnecessary for a President to use his 
veto power as he did against the Freedmen's Bill, and it is 
nothing short of absurd and ridiculous to have a national ex-
ecutive engage in a useless tirade suoh as he gave in his Feb-
ruary twenty-second speech. 
Not all of the opposition went to an extreme because of 
these acts, however, and ~~. Godkin of The Nation is a good 
example. He urged the people to remember that, "no matter 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
Ha.l.'~ers Weekly, 'Ma.l.'oh 10, 1866. 
!bl ., February 26, 1866. 
WOOtrrow Wilson, A History of the American Peotle, 
lew York, 19o1 p. 2 
Ibid. 
Vol. v. 
r 
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what 1~. Johnson may say or do, he is our President, and his 
shame is our shame, a fact which people in the excitement of 
37 
party contests are apt to forget". The Boston Transcript 
lists The Washington Chronicle and Philadelphia Press as 
friendly to Johtlson at this time, and both were edited by M.r. 
Forney. But editorials in these Journals gradually became more 
intense against llr. Johnson, until the following summary was 
made by the Washington Chronicle in the fall of 1866; "The 
present deplorable condition in the South is the necessary re-
sult of the President's policy and of his political associa-
tions. He now belongs with the whole rebel population of the 
38 
South". The New York Tribune,whioh was recognized by anti-
39 
Johnson papers as being friendly to him, spoke of Johnson's 
inebriation as an excuse for his recent outbursts, and later 
expressed regret that "the best excuse which could be offered 
40 
for it could no longer be pleaded in palliation". Executive 
ability has declined to a low ebb when intoxication is usea 
to excuse a public address, and no matter what his former 
reoord had been or how staunchly he now supported the people, 
or whether he ever was intoxic&tea in his life, indications 
from the press of that day show plainly that he created a 
tremendous ~orce of public op~hion against his cause. !his, 
37. The Nation, 1A:aroh 15, 1866. 
38. The Washington Chronicle, September 14, 1866. 
39. The Boston Transcript, ~oh 13, 1866. 
40. The New York Times, February 24, 1866. 
in the end, defeated the very plan for which he seemed to be 
working, and Judging from his tactless procedure, he was in-
strumental in aggravating his own downfall. 
Senator Trumbull of Illinois had now seen his Freedmen's 
Bureau Bill defeated, but a second bill was brought forth by 
him, called the Civil Rights Bill, under which the negroes 
were declared to be citizens of the United States. By ]~ch 
13,- it had passed the House and wa.s ready for the President's 
signature. Harpers weekly hoped, by March 31, that "the bill 
41 
might be approved by him and become a law". But while most 
people were uncertain as to what Johnson would do, and at a 
time when logical thought was needed, Thaddeus Stevens gave a 
speech in the House in which he disrespectfully harangued the 
42 
Chief Executive. This led some to say "Thaddeus Stevens had 
no single quality of a statesman except fidelity to a princi-
43 
ple", which necessarily meant his principle, and the further 
remark, "we insist that Mr. Johnson has reason to be hurt and 
indignant when he is represented as the friend and ally of 
44 
red-handed rebels". Even if Stevens' remarks were erratic and 
unnecessarily bitter, it was no excuse for an unnecessary 
veto, if it is felt that the veto was uncalled for by circum-
stances. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
Har~ers weekly, March 31,1866. 
Rho es, Vol. v. p. 582. 
Har~ers Weekly, April 7, 1866. 
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While the bill was pending in Congress it was diseussed by 
the Cabinet, where Seward, McCulloch, and Welles supported 
Johnson's plan of a veto. John Sherman's private letters claim 
that Johnson "deceived and misled his best friends". Sherman 
says, "I know he led many to believe he would agree to the 
45 
Civil Rights Bill". Rhodes says that Governor Oliver P. Mor-
ton of Indiana hastened to Washington, D.C. and begged the 
President to sign the bill, urging that otherwise the rent be-
46 
tween him and his party would be beyond mending". Governor 
!lorton's prestige may be judged by some words of George W. 
Julian of the Radicals. Julian had little reason to heap flatt 
ery upon Morton for the two were life-long political enemies, 
and he adds, "I only make these statements in justice to the 
47 
truth", for "it oannot be denied his services to the country 
48 
in this orisis were great•, and summarizes his importance as 
follows:- "Governor Morten was a phenomenal figure in American 
politics during the war period, and played a very remarkable 
49 
part in the affairs of his Party". Apparently, Johnson misled 
some of the political leaders to the same extent that he did 
in giving an anti-rebel impression when he first aoceded to 
offioe. And secondly, he made the veto appear as a defiance, 
45. Rhodes, Vol.V, p. 582. 
46. Ibid., P• 583. 
47. Julian, p. 271. 
48. Ibid., P• 270. 
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since there was certainly no reason why this bill would have 
wrecked his plan at all, and there were several reasons why 
the veto did do that. McCulloch upheld the veto in the Cabinet 
session, but some years later recorded that "the veto of the 
Civil Rights Bill turned not only the Republican Party, but 
the general public sentiment of Northern people against John-
son, and from that time on~d there was open hostility be-
50 
tween legislative and executive branches of the government". 
one advantage in using advisers is supposedly the better op-
portunity of having insight plus foresight. In this ease, 1~. 
McCulloch's insight functioned almost twenty years too late to 
be of any puticular use, if we ma~ judge from the above 
statement taken from his reminiscences of this period. 
Following the veto, some declared it was only what they ex-
pected, and added that "the arguments of the veto are loaned 
51 
Mr. Johnson by some Democratic lawyers in Washington D.C." 
The Chicago Daily Tribune openly called for impeachment; ~e 
believe on the simple merits of his action he deserver to be 
impeached by the House, tried before the Senate, and removed 
52 
from office". President Johnson stated in his veto that he 
represented all of the people, while Congressmen had only a 
section or separ.&ie group of constituents. In reply to this, 
50. McCulloch, p. 381. 
51. The Boston Transcript, March 28, 1866 
52. The Chloago Dally Tribune, Maroh 31, 1866. 
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The Atlantic Monthly maintained that he was not elected to 
represent all of the people. "The President was not elected by 
the voice of the loyal people for the office he now holds. Our 
53 
congressmen were elected for the exact position they hold". 
As to protecting the rights of eleven Southern states, it was 
seriously doubted whether "magnanimity which sacrifices the 
M 
innocent in order to propitiate the guilty" is highly desir-
able. As we have seen, Mr. McCulloch admitted later that this 
veto turned general opinion in the North, and it may be added 
here that as a political move it was quite tactless, inasmuch 
as it opened the way for an almost complete Radical victory. 
About the only thing in Johnson's favor is the fact that 
the Radicals had carefully planned against him, and the evi-
dence is too strong to deny. Henry J. Raymond brought this out 
after the veto by asking the country not to forget that "the 
critical period through which we are passing is the result not 
of Presidential caprice, obstinacy or ambition, but of the 
disposition of the Radicals to force through legislation look-
55 
ing to negro supremacy in the South". Welles wrote earlier in 
March, 1866, •stevens is determined to have an issue between 
the Executive and Congress, notwithstanding that the country 
deprecates such an issue. I incline to the opinion that, by 
53. The Atlantic Monthly, Ap*il, 1866. 
54. Ibid. 
55. The New York Times, March 31, 1866. 
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' the working of his Directory machinery, he will be successful 
56 
in raising that issue". These remarks only substantiate what 
has been said prior to this concerning a determination of one 
group to :right the ahief Executive, and Stevens' bitter speech 
made before the veto may have been nothing more t~an a foul 
57 
method of evoking that veto to aggravate public opinion. 
So far as editorial opinion is concerned, the February 
twenty-seconl speech an4 the first veto of the Freedmen's 
Bureau Bill rather than the Civil Rights Bill marks the sig-
nifieant change against Andrew Johnson. For a year fhe Chicago 
Daily Tribune had criticized him, but with the addition of 
John w. Forney and E.L. Godkin to the opposition, journalistic 
creation of public opinion was decidedly anti-Johnson. Mr. 
Godkin openly denounced much that aohnson did, but when im-
peachment was imminent a year later, he reminded the American 
public of Johnson's past patriotism and pleaded for patience. 
"Andrew Johnson has in times past been tried and not found 
wanting in patriotism, in devotion to the Union, in faithful-
58 
ness to his obligations". It is certainly not fair to claim,as 
George w. Julian di&,that the veto of the Bureau Bill "stripped 
59 
Johnson of all disguises". The evidence shows him to be obsti-
nate, tactless, and erat1e in speech, but it does not prove 
56. Welles, Vol. II, p.443. 
57. Rhodes, Vol. V, p.582. 
58. The Nation, March 1, 1867. 
59. Julian, p. 274. 
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that ~everybody could now see the mistake of his nomination 
60 
at Baltimore". Furthermore, there is little reason, so far as 
editorial opinion indicates, for supporting Woo~row Wilson's 
conjention that "a less headstrong man might by conference 
have hit upon some plan by whioh his differences with the lead 
61 
ers in Congress would have been accommodated". Negor suffrage 
was demanded, and there is great doubt as to whether any other 
accommodation would have been considered. At any rate, it was 
no time to defy Northern opinion and strengthen Congress by 
resistance when Congressional elections were so near. Could 
Johnson have held his tongue and signed the two bills, his sup 
port in Congress would have undoubtedly been made stronger by 
the new elections. He gave up that opportunity and chose a way 
that was destined to bring him defeat. 
Opinion was divided in suoh a way as to give credit to Con-
gress while Johnson appeared as a rather stubborn individual. 
"The President is unquestionably pure of purpose and very 
determined, but the equal integrity, ability, devotion and 
62 
firmness of Congress cannot be questioned". So long as suoh 
an opinion existed, and Johnson defied Congress, thea people 
were likely to vote against him. The New York Herald added an 
60. Ibid. 
61. wrrion, Vol. v. p. 32. 
62. Harpers Weekly-, April 14, 1866. 
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enlightening statement that the Congressional party in America 
was made up of " The God-fearing and Bible reading portion of 
63 
the people". Now that an appeal had been made to Puritanical 
elements, the next th&ng was to hearken back to Lincoln's day 
and show some discrepancy between Johnson and Lincoln. In his 
last public speech 1~. Lincoln said,"the Executive claims no 
right to say when or whether members should be admitted to 
64 
seats in Congress". This statement became quite prom&nent as 
a quotation in an effort to induce some degree of submission 
on Johnson's part to Congressional measuzes. The New York 
wnrld concluded that the "earnestness" of Congressional mem-
bers was best mamtfested by the open call foe impeachment on 
the part of Radical papers. "The faot that the mask is thrown 
off evinces the intense malignity and 'earnestness' of Presi-
65 
dential enemies". Obviously, the entire problem now facedaa 
final solution at the ballot box. 
The Radicals used future elections as a threat and it was 
quite apparent that no compromise was possible, The Boston 
Transcript said, " Mr. Johnson can indulge in self-will and 
passion. The issue will finally be settled at the ballot box, 
and defeat is assured those who reconstruct states out of 
66 
Rebel material". The chief alm~ow was mot to conciliate, but 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
The New York Herald, July Z, 1866. 
Harper$ Weeklt' lpril 21, 1866. 
The lew Yorkorld, April 5, 1866. 
The Bos£on Triiscript, June 5, 1866. 
67 
to K set upon a platform for public support". All hope of con-
ciliation lay in sub~ission on Johnson's part, and at this 
stage of the battle it is difficult to see just why he should 
have submitted. Almost anyone could see that " a little radi-
calism under the circumstances was perhaps natural and pardon-
68 89 
able~, but the insistence upon " making treason odious" meant 
treating the South as a conquered p%ovinoe, and this, in ttzn, 
was relinquishing all policy in favor of Mr. Stevens,together 
with his Radical supporters in the House and Senate. 
Undoubtedly consistency is an admirable trait, but Mr, Ste-
vens' consistency had by this time developed into a policy of 
"Radicalism, olear and undisguised; Partisanship,stern and un-
70 
relenting". There no longer was a middle ground of reason be-
tween M.r. stevens and the President, but the Johnson supporters 
firmly believed " patriotism would array itself with the latter 
71 
and partisanship with the former". Ordinarily a decision by 
the United States Supreme Court is supposed to throw some light 
upon the problems with which it deals, otherwise our govern-
mental system does not funation according to its oonstitutiona 
basis. In this oase, such dec•sions had little weight with the 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
~· Hariers Weekly, June 2, 1866. 
tbl • 
The Baltimore Sun, May, Zl, L866. 
rill. 
L 
congressmen. An example was given when Justice Nelsoa of the 
supreme Cout rendered his decision in the Egan Case of 1866. 
Judging from the following words, this decisi&n was quite def-
initely in favor of Johnson's plan:- " Indeed, the moment the 
rebellion was suppressed, the ancient authority, possession 
'72 
and laws resumed their accustomed sway". Now with this decis-
ion , the opinion of Stevens, Sumner,and others that Southern 
states had forfeited all their rights fell completely to the 
ground. 
These leaders in Congress looked upon the South as con-
quered territory, and the use of the negro as the main fruit 
of emancipation. According to woodrow Wilson, "the negro be-
came to them a creature who heeded only liberty to make him a 
73 
man"•••••"They let their sentiment and their sense of power 
'74 
dictate their thought and purpose". In April,l866, after Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Bill over the President's veto, 
they also sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the States, " as if 
less confident of their constitutional ground than of their 
'15 
parliamentary supremacy". First of all, any Southern State 
that reJeoted it was denied admission to the Union, and second 
ly subJected to a loss of representative power because of de-
nial of suffrage to the negro. rt·is no wonder that Ju. Johnso 
72. Ibid,June 4,1866. 
73. Wilson, Vol. v. p.22. 
'74. Ib14. 
'75. fila •• p.aa. 
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expressed his opinion against such a move, but some of the 
opposition said, "there is nothing in it which is not strictly 
in consonance with Mr. Johnson's views, so we hope, for the 
76 
sake of harmony, he will not oppose it"."We can see no purpose 
in opposition unless to reiterate ~is conviction that no amend 
menta shall be passed until the unrepresented states are ad-
77 
mitted". Any attempt to compromise or use conciliatory meth-
ods was condemned and the question was asked; "Is the Presi-
dent to be supported because he is the ohampion of concilia-
tion and peace? Congress believes that his conciliation is the 
compromise of vital principles, and his peaoe~s surrender of 
78 
human rights". The final radical suggestion as a conclusion to 
all this was for "Congress by a joint resolution of both 
79 
Houses to call upon the President to resign". Impeachment was 
the solution advocated by radical journals during June and 
July of 1866. 
Pro~Johnson sentiment, however, was not lacking and ~ 
Baltimore Sun ran an article on "The Deceptive Constttutional 
SCI 
Amendment". WThis amendment (Fourteenth) aims at deluding 
the people, while avoiding the appearance of a conflict with 
76. 
7'1. 
78. 
79. 
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L 
Johnson. It is artfUlly framed to effect the purposes ot the 
axtreme Radicals in Congress and creates a gul~ as wide as 
81 
righ~ and wrong between itsel~ and Andrew Johnson's policy". 
In the opinion of The New Yorl:;, World, "the President's chief 
82 
mistake"at this crucial time was not so much in his opposition 
83 
to the amendment as in"keeping the Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln". 
Evidence is quite plain that people recognized this lack of 
harmony in the Cabinet and that his friends urged a change. 
Henry J. Raymond stood b7 the President in proclaiming that 
"we sustain, thoroughly and heartily,the position of the Presi-
84 
dent upon this subject". Above all, said !he New York Times, 
"the people want the Union restored, and in our opinion will 
85 
send members to the next Congress who will restore it". 
Southern viewpoints nat~ally did not appease the appetite 
of eager politicians sinee they offered opposition to complete 
control of the South. one paper said, "we did not figh~ five 
years for the negro. Restore the Union and the negro will 
find his proper place under the protection of those most deepl 
86 
interested in his welfare". The whole South had gone to work 
with zeal, and Kentucky papers urged a persistent campaign for 
financial power as the only means of reviving Southern life. 
81. Ibi,. 
82. The New York world, June 16, 1866. 
83. !bll. 
8~. The New York Times, June 9, 1866. 
85. !bi(. . 
86. ~Lexington Observer and Reporter, August 29, 1866. 
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The remarks made were undoubtedl7 quite tactless, and worked 
against amnesty on the part of Congress. However, some of the 
harshness of these statements was caused by the truth that was 
in them. For example, The LexiD§tOn Observer and Reporter sug-
gested a hope that by a few years of persistent industry the 
"silver stolen by Butler,furniture burned by Sherman, and cost 
87 
ly books captured by pious chaplains could be replaced". 
One event whioh tended to give further stimulus to anti-
southern feeling was an outbreak in New Orleans. This received 
wide publicity throughout the nation, since the event centered 
around General Butler, who was located there, and offered an 
opportunity to demand something more of the South. First of all 
the Northern press declared that a white man fired the first 
shot, and that the mayor, an appointee of Johnson, sided with 
the mob. The ~ation summarized the whole affair by calling 
Johnson's dispatch to the Louisiana Attorney-General as "dis-
graceful", and added that " any reconstruction that does not 
secure for Wendell Phillips the power of delivering one ot his 
most radical lectures in any town ot village of the South, 
with complete security, must be a mookery,a delusion, and a 
88 
snarer General Grant had faced the South on the field of 
battle, and now in testifying as the reconstruction of this 
""""'' 
same area saidt "The South is anxious to return under a 
87. Ibid., September 5, 1866. 
sa. The Nation, August E, 1866. 
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89 
course which was not humiliating to them as citizens"~ Not 
many citizens of the South could have listened to Wendell 
Phillips' most radical lectures and upheld respect for them-
selves, to sat little of avoiding humiliation. It had been 
stated before this time that "Wendell Phillips is a man whose 
mission is to oppose everything; he first opposed slavery, 
then President Johnson, and among other things he occassionall 
90 
opposes himself." The National Intelligencer said, "we are no 
advocates of vengeance. America can afford to for,ive the 
91 
South for this riot and forget Ben Butler". 
Our Chief Executive felt that an appeal to the people might 
prevent Congress from securing a radical majority. To aoaom-
plish this purpose a tour was planned. The immediate occasion 
for it was an invitation from Chivago asking the President to 
deliver an address at the laying of the corner-stone for a 
monument to Stephen A. Douglas. During the preceding year, 
William Cullen Bryant declared, "Johnson was proving himself 
one of the most discreet, clear-sighted, upright, and saga-
92 
oious statesmen of the age". This type of sentiment was not 
present in 1866 when the tour began, but Johnson at least had 
prospects of making an appeal. Henry Raymond said~ we believe 
89. The Baltimore Sun, June 21, 1866. 
90. !he few !ork Her&ld, June 2, 1866. 
91. !he latlonal Intelligenoer, June 29, 1866. 
92. The lew York Evening~ost, June 20, l866.(quoted, Milton) 
p.220. 
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both the President and the country will be benefited by the 
tour. We think it would be an excellent thing to follow this 
93 
to~ by another through the Southern States". One aspect of 
. 
never-failing importance for Johnson's day was the presence of 
opposition in the religious press of America. ft The Boston 
Transcript said that, "the religioul press of America now 
94 
unanimously condemned Mr. Lincolnts apostate successor". 
One encouraging fact for the President was the support of 
friends who upheld him in his plan of reconstruction. Thomas 
Ewing of Ohio, a leader of the lhio baz, had supported the 
President f'rom the beginning of his administration. He and 
Lewis D. Campbell had fought for control of Republican State 
conventions since 1865, against Ben Wade, Ashley, Giddings 
95 
and others destined later to be quite radical in their Yiews. 
:Mr. Ewing issued a statement in the Baltim8re Sua in support 
of Johnson on August 14, 186i, which came at & time when sound 
logical support was badly needed if the speaking tour was to 
mean anything. Ewing declared,"Congress itself is unconsti-
tutional. Therefore the Civil Rights Bill, Freedmens Bureau 
96 
Bill and Fourteenth Amendment are unconstitutional." This 
argument of Mr. Ewing was based upon the fact that Southern 
States were out of the Union while-national legislation was 
93. The New York Times August 20, 1866. 
94. Tne Boston Transcript, August,20, 1866. 
95. ii!ton, P• 2!1. 
96. ~he Baltimore Sun, August 14, 1866. 
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enacted, and included the pertinent remark that, "exclusion is 
necessary only to retain power in the hands of the present 
97 
majority". 
Across the Atlantic, French newspaper opinion spoke f'avorab~ 
ly of Johnson. An editorial in LaLiberte said: n THis Presi-
9 
dent Johnson has become a most devoted agent of reconciliation. 
He really was attempting to complete restoration despite 
severe opposition, and with his proclamation restoring civil 
authority in Texas,the Union was completed. The Baltimore Sun 
stated, wthere is but one other step now necessary at the 
hands of the Executive, and that is to remove all restrictions 
99 
from the proclamation of Amnesty". This would ha.a been very 
well, providing the Executive could exert authority enough to 
accomplish such a purpose. The necessary move now was to in-
fluence public opinion sufficiently to secure a friendly Con~ 
gress. 
Publio speaking had been costly to Johnson prior to this, 
and now he was in tremendous danger of saying many things to 
antagonize people, especially when influenced by feeling more 
than by logical thinking. Mr. Godkin thought w he is either 
under W%etched advisers or is himself unmanageable. His speech 1oa 
es are vulgar, egotistical, and sometimes profane". The only 
97. Ibid., August 14,1866. 
98. Ibid.; August 24,1866. 
99. Ibid., August 20,1866. 
100. !he Nation, September 6, 1866. 
L 
mitigating circumstance in Mr. Godkin's criticism was an 
apology for using such harsh terms, but as he explained,"these 
harsh words were necessary after a careful reading of the 
101 
speeohes". Harpers Weekly defied any man to "read the speeche 
lo2 
uttered by the President without wincing with mortification". 
Chicago's welcome was not at all enthusiaatia, according to 
The Chioyo Daily lribune,but "may be likened to a frost in 
midsummer, killing flowers and casting gloom over the face of 
103 
Nature". The New York Observer upheld Johnson, but on Sep-
tember,20,regretted to say that " President Johnson's style 
has often been such as to sadden and even mortify national 
104 
pride". This newspaper then continued to uphold him by criti-
cising the people for according him such a poor welcome. "H1a 
reception in some of the places is deserving of severest repro-
105 
bation". Sumner's paper said the speeches were,"unsurpassed 
106 
for shallowness", and th&S the " President chose to leave the 
1o7 
Capital and become a stump orator or demagogue". In his 
108 
speech at Cleveland he remarked," I do not care about dignity". 
His friend, Mr. Raymond could only say he "greatly regretted 
101. Ibid. 
102. H&rPers Weekly, September 22, 1866. 
103. !he chlc~o Dailf ~ribune, September 7, 
104. The New ~rk wor a, september 20, 1866. 
105. fbi!. 
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106. ~Boston Transcript, August 30, 1866. 
107. fbid. 
lOS. !ie New York Times, September 7, 1866. 
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Down in Kentuoky the visit was ~ailed as "the most remark-
able official tour in our history. The Radioals have shown an 
' 
utter want of decenoy in their treat~ent of him during a 
time like this when Courage and Truth are aore preoioua 'than 
110 
dignity". The Baltimo•e Sun looked upon the President as "no 
111 
polished orator, but an earnest man". Furthermore, acoording 
to this paper even though his speeches were at times ra.ther 
impassioned, " he gave a oonolusive answer to the unscrupulous 
112 
enemies of restoration". A s~a.ry of the Baltimore speeoh 
inoludes some salient arguments of the President. The South 
fought because the North in its estimation, endangered the 
Constitution. fhey did not fight against the Constitution, but 
against a Union they thought bro~e the Constitution. After 
being oompelled to lay down arms, "the South is now as firmly 
113 
for the Constitution as always". The Baltimore Sun oalled 
114 
this last remark the " oorner-stone of his speech". 
Whatever else may be said, it must he admitted that Andrew 
Johnson made a 4esperate effort to bring back the Southern 
States without having negro suffrage teraed upon them. Nothing 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
Ibid. 
The Lexington Observer and Reporter, September 15,1866. 
The B&ltimore Sun, September !, 1866. 
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proves this any more than persistent criticism by the radical 
exponent of negro suffrage, The Chicago Daill Tribune, which 
stated that, "for MZ. Johnson longer to persist in his attempt 
to restore the Rebels to power without such guarantees as the 
publie sentiment demands, would be to defy and insult the 
American people in a manner requiring more turpitude than even 
115 
Andrew Johnson has yet displayed"• Apparently these guarantees 
that publio sentiment demanded amounted to nothing more than 
negro sutfrage, and this was definitely statel when The Balti-
more Sun remin4ed people; " One single act remains to be done-
the admission of representatives, but the separation party 
has entrenched itself behind the proposed amendment, negro 
116 
suffrace. " 
Radical leaders were quite busy while the tour was being 
made. Ben Butler spoke in Cleveland and informed the audience 
there that ~. Johnson has filled thirty offtces now without 
117 
Senate concurrence. The Senate is already deprived ot its righ 
118 
Thaddeus Stevens called the entire affair"A circus". ~ 
Nation probably gave Stevens too much credit by "deploring 
his oratory for the same reason he indulged in it-- tor the 
119 -
sake of the cause". Stevens had only one cause now, and that 
115. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October ll, 1866. 
116. The Baltimore Sun, September 24, 1866. 
117. The Nation, October 4, 1866. 
118. Ibid. 
119. 'ml'. 
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was Republican domination by a Republican Congress. The evi-
dence lies in his speeohes and attitude towa.rd Johnson, to-
gether with the way in which legislation was engineered by his 
Reconstruction Commit~ee. 
New England opposition to the South was bitterly resented. 
The LeXington Observer and Reporter openly stated: •It may be 
taken ~or granted that so long as the New England &ligarohy 
continues to control the public sentiment, Kentucky and the 
South will be excluded from a share in the Federal Government. 
wendell Phillips declares there oan be no lasting peace until 
South Carolina, Louisiana and Kentucky are born again in the 
image of Massaohusetts. Bew England civilization stands ready 
120 
to throttle us". 
Some of the fruite of his February twenty-seaond speech 
eame before Mr. Johnson as John w. Forney attempted to create 
opposition to him by using his Washington Chronicle for that 
purpose. Mr. Forney answered Thomas Ewing's appeal tp the 
Constitution in favor of Johnson by quoting from a speech the 
latter made in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1864. "Whenever you 
find a man prating about the Constitution--- spot him; for he 
121 
is a traitor". lmny of these editorial discussions had been 
made with pro-Johnson papers, and The Baltimore Sun, which 
120. The Lexi~ton Observer and Reporter, November 21, 1866. 
121. The wash~ton ebion!cle, ootober 5, 1866. 
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printed Mr Ewing's article, had given a fairly good answer to 
Forney's thrust in an eulier issue. "Isolated facts and incom~ 
pleteness is a wanton thing when generalizations are made from 
thea. We shall never prepare accounts to serve the corrupi 
122 
purposes of a faction". However, the No~thern people who read 
The WashiASton Chronicle saw there a oomplete denunciation of 
the President not based entirely upon isolated facta. ~o­
ever favors President Johnson, wishes to strip the l6yal North 
of twenty-five members in Congress, and give twenty-five seats 
123 
to the disloyal South".(:The President's Journal in Washington 
tried to overcome this, and urged people to "remember that the 
124 
plan ot the President rests upon Constitutional government". 
We are brought back at this time to a former reference made 
to Andrew Johnson's nomination for Vice-President. Charles 
Sumner gave a speech in Washington D.C., early in October, 1866 
in which he called Johnson "a creature of an accident, and in-
125 
ferior in ability and character". Mr. Sumner referred to the 
immediate cause of Johnsonts acoession,whioh was an accident, 
but did not mention the political battle at Baltimore, June7, 
1864, in which his political designs against Seward fesulted 
126 
in Johnson's nomination. 
Meanwhile as the election~·approached, more radioal state-
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
The Baltimore Sun, September 7, 1866. 
The WiShl~on chronicle, oetober 4, 1866. 
The Natlo~ Inte!Il~enoer, September 13, 1866. 
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~is, Chapter I, p.l. 
r 
-69-
ments were made on both sides. The Chicago Times, a Democratic 
journal, ~gested a hasty and decisive method. "An industri-
ous and energetio application of the guillotine is all that is 
127 
need.ed to remove the Republican Jarty and save the country". 
This journal went further into the administration and gave 
some comparisons of prominent men. "If there is a worse man in 
the United States than Ben Butler, that man is Edwin M. Stan-
ton. Only those aapa•le of analyzing deliberate remorseless 
scoundrelism aan understand the aharaater of either of these 
128 
wretches". More light was thrown upon the New Orleans riot 
by telling how General Baird sent a telegram to Stanton. Stan-
ton placed it in his pocket and did not say a word concerning 
it unitl a week after the riot, and then, before informing the 
129 
President as to its contents, sent it to the press. This type 
of journal was branded as 1 Copperhead', and did not succeed in 
exerting enough influence to save many votes for Johnson's 
support in the autumn elections. 
People in the seceded area had very little confidence in 
political aid and frankly admitted it. There plans turned to 
industrial and oommeroial welfare as the only means of re-
ga.ining prestige. The Lexington Observer and Reporter thought, 
"if the South could make herself rich and prosperous she could 
127. The Chioago Times, October ll, 1866. 
l28t tbta~. lovember Ia, 18&6. 
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130 
secure every political right she desired". An editorial state-
ment like this is ~uite prophetic and true to later develop-
ments, as we shall aee from the following words ot Frederic L. 
Paxson ~itten in 1915,"The tuture ot American politics atter 
1865 was·largely determined by the methods by which the reve-
nue had been increased. It was a prosperous Union that emerged 
trom the Civil War and every region but the South was strong 
131 
in its conscious wealth". In addition to the economic motive, 
the south saw how people of the North supported Congress, and 
thereto•• prepared tor the worst. !he Chic!So Times said Con-
gress quite obviously meant to carry measure to an extreme,and 
&dded," the South may expect more degrading conditions than 
132 
those heretofore offered". 
Interpretations of the radical victory were immediately 
forthcoming as an aftermath of the elections to Congress. The 
......... 
Atlantic Monthly remarked, "the controversy has been disposed 
ot by the people. The high reconstruction powers which John-
son so h&ughtily,ostentatiously and confidently claimed have 
been disallowed, denounced and utterly repudiated, while those 
133 
of congress have been confirmed"• Mr. Raymond held out one 
ray of hope and did not desert Iohnson when he wr•te in The 
......... 
New York Times:-"If the President will consent to retrace his 
130. 
131. 
132. 
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steps a little, it will not be difficult for him to present a 
plan which will oomman4 the respect and the sanction of the 
134 
great maJority of American people•" A hope of this nature was 
too idealistic to be of any value under the circumstances, but 
it is encouraging to see a more careful analysis of events as 
given in lhe Baltimore Sun." The results plainly show that the 
Northern States declare in favor of more stringent measures 
135 
of reconstruction than those of the President". The Baltimore 
Sun did not believe the maJority ot Northern people would re-
quire negro suffrage "because nearly all Northern Sta.tes deny 
136 
suffrage to their negroes". The last argument must have struck 
Northern leaders as quite true but decidedly impractical. At 
any rate, the elections were no direct indorsement of Ben 
Butlets impeachment program except insofar as they gave the 
Radicals enough votes to earry this out if lesirable. There 
was really no contest now, for the force was too mnch on one 
side. "Surely no public man ever encountered such sudden and 
137 
bitter retribution". Retribution was not completed, however, 
until iapeachment was attempted, so 1866 closed with the 
President facing impeachment. 
134. The New York Times, November 19, 1866. 
135. !he !&l'timore SUii , December 4, 1866. 
136. r'b14'. 
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There is no assurance that Congress would have been satis-
fied to admit the Southern St&tes with no other guarantee than 
the acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Oberholtzer 
says, "if ever there had been a time when Congress might have 
been contented with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a condition upon which the Southern States might return to 
1 
their Federal relationships, it had now passed". This was 
blamed upon Andrew Johnson in a speech made by James A. Gar-
field, who stated that "if the President had on any day since 
last July advised the people of the South to accept the Con-
stitutional Amenlment (Fourteenth) and come in as Tennessee 
2 
did, it would have been done". Mr. Garfield's assurance of 
such return is further substantiated by George w. Julian's be-
lief; "If the Fourteenth Amendment had been at first accepted, 
the work of reconstruction would have ended without conferring 
the ballot upon the negro. This will scarcely be denied by 
anyone, and has been frankly admitted by some of the most dis-
3 
tinguished leaders of the party". 
Southern people recognized this, as may be seen in the 
statement from the Lexington Observer and Reporter that "the 
great majority are bent on enfranchisement of blacks, together 
4 
with the disfranchisement of rebel whites". Furthermore,this 
1. Oberholtzer, Vol. v. p. 425. 
2. Rhodes, Vol. VI. p.5. 
3. Julian, p. 304. 
4. The Lexin ton Observer and Re orter,January 2, 1867. 
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paper added that " Congress is supported by twenty dominant 
states, flushed with victory, and anxious to insult and pro-
5 
scribe ten or eleven enfeebled states". This humiliation was 
magnified through a suspicion that even if the amendments were 
accepted, there would be no reliet or escape from vindictive 
measures. George s. Shanklin, Congressman from Lexington,Ken-
tucky, sa•d," not one fourth of the Radicals are in favor of 
admitting Southern states even if they do ratify the Thir-
6 
teenth Amendment". Sectionalism was entirely too noticeable in 
this suffrage drive to permit the use of much New England re-
ligious protection, or of very much patriotic appeal. There 
was eonsiderable talk in papers throughout the land about the 
crime of rebel leaders and the terrible depravity of slavery, 
but The Chicago Daill Tribune was the only Journal that had 
developed the idea to such an extent as t6 claim it would be 
easier to educate the four million negroes for citizenship 
than to attempt a return of the rebel whites. 
Congress started out bf presenting a bill to the President 
granting negro suffrage in the District of Columbia. Charles 
Sumner was the guiding hand of this measuee, and he presented 
it to the Senate before that body was in session an hour. It 
was approved in less than a fortnight, and the House pass-ed.' · 
5. Ibid., January 9, 1867. 
6. !Dtr., January 2, 1867. 
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it with prompt decision on the :following day, December,l4, 
7 
1a66. On January 4,la67, Johnson read his veto message on the 
bill, in a Cabinet meeting,a:tter which Edwin M. Stanton took 
from his portfolio a brief, and carefUlly expounded his approv 
al o:t the bill. He could see no Constitutional objections to 
it, and therefore urged the President to sign it. Welles ob-
jected quite strenously to Stanton's argument, and admits he 
a 
"expected that Stanton would be defiant", but the latter "said 
9 
not a word". General Grant was present at the Cabinet meeting, 
by invitation, and was very emphatic in his ttatements against 
the bill because w he thought it a very contemptible business 
:tor memhers of Congress whose states excluded negroes, to give 
10 
them suffrage in this district". Attorney-General Stanberry 
thought the Supreme Court would probably declare against such 
a measure, but the immediate occasion demanded action, so 
Johnson expressed his opinion in a veto. 
Immediately upon receipt of the veto, Congress listened to 
speeches for several hours, and then proseeded to pass the 
bill over Johnson's veto. Acoording,to Oberholtzer, "the 
negro had been .rp.ade the peer of the white man at the ballot 
box in that domain of the United States under direct Congress-
7. Oberholtzer, Vol. I. p.l43. 
a. Welles, Vol. III. P.4. 
9 • Ibid • , p • 5 • 
10. !bid. 
11 
ional control". No time was taken for any reconsideration of 
the measure, and it was passed with such 4ecisive force that 
no one could doubt the power Of the legislative branch over 
any executive veto. Johnson's message vetoing the bill was a 
"clear, compact argument against a moat unwise and unjust meas-
12 
ure", said The National Intelligencer. The Chicago Daily 
Tribune could stand no interference whatever, aad argued that 
" Mr 9 Johnson thinks Congress ought not to attempt to frustrate 
13 
his attempts to carry on the government". Of course, this 
argument s~oed now, because the mass of people had repudi-
ated Johnson at the polls, aad had given evidence that they 
saw things in practically the same light. 
Congress had one more branch of the united States to deal 
with before becoming absolutely supreme. This was the Supreme 
court. That Tribunal created a considerable amount of turmoil 
by the decision handed down in the Milligan case. ~is was 
published December 17, 1866, and newspapers were filled with 
it during the early part of January, 1867. The Supreme Court 
ruled that neither the President nor Congress had the power 
to deo~are martial law, and to authorize the trial of a oiti-
14 
zen by mililtuy tribunals where the civil courts were openl ~ 
Exoitmment man high in Congress!f and -especially among those 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Oberholtzer, Vol. I, P• 425. 
The National Intellifenoer, January 8, 1867. 
The chio;go Daily Tr bune, January 9, l8i7. 
Rho4ea, ol. VI, p. 13 . 
' L 
in opposition to Johnson. On January 10, 1867, The Nation 
talked of iapeaching the judges. Coercion seemingly had be-
come a Congressional policy, and if any power stood in the way, 
15 
impeachment was declared necessary. Rhodes says the chief 
reason for causing Congress to be thrown into the hands of 
Radicals was the almost unanimous rejection of the Fourteenth 
16 
Amendment by Southern States. His statement only substantiates 
an already evident fact that negro suffrage was paramount. 
Whatever discussion may be raised over suffrage, those opposed 
to Johnson were equally convinced of a breach of :faith, not 
only in executive, but now in juducial circles. The Chic~o 
Daill Tribune remarked, "we cannot rely upon the Judicial 
Depaitment of our government to cooperate in securing the 
17 
fruits of a hard-earned victory over the rebels." "Copper-
head" opinion expressed hope in recent decisions o:f the Su-
preme Court, because it was intimated that " the vtto power, 
however wisely exercised, is no restriction upon corrupt, 
18 
vicious or unconstitutional legislation". The excitement 
aroused over Supreme Court activities shows quite clearly what 
Congress would demand, and it likewise tends to show that 
Andrew Johnson, with all his mistakes, did not necessarily 
bring all his troubles upon himself. 
15. The Nation, January 10, 1867. 
16. tliia. 
17. ~Chicago Daily Tribune, January 15, 1867. 
18. The Chicago Times, January, 9, 1867. 
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Radical Journals could usually bring forth abundant argu-
ments in support ot their case, and Mr. Lincoln was once more 
used as proof against the new autocrat, the United States 
Supreme Court. Lincoln said, "the candid citizen must confess 
that if the policy of our government upon vital questions 
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fised by su-
preme Court decisions, then the instantt these questions are 
given to the Cpurt, the people sign their government into the 19 . 
hands of that eminent tribunal". A remedy was suggested by 
following the precedent ot earlier years, and The Chic!6o 
Daily Tribune used the following example;" ~he Supreme Court, 
many years ago, decided that the United States Bask was Con-
stitutional, but the people, taking a different view, decided 
20 
otherwise, and the charter was not renewed". Gideon Welles 
had reasons to see the possibility of a fundamental change in 
our government, and stated; "We are living in a revolutionary 
period, and the character of the government is undergoing a 
21 
strain whivh may transform it into a different character". 
While historians to not deal much with impeachment at this 
particular period, the people throughout America were reading 
it almost every day in some of the laading Journals. The Bos-
ton Transcript busied itself with a discussion of how many 
19. The Chicago Dail~ Tribune, January 17,1867. 
20. Ibid., January I , 1867. 
21. li!Ies, Vol. III. P.l7. 
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times 1~. Johnson had oalled Congress a disloyal body, and by 
heaping criticism upon Gileon Welles, who persisted in support 
ing the Exeo•tive. It was said that Welles had been dismissed 
from the Navy Department some years before as an inoompetent 
assistant. Impeachment had developed to the point where some 
were wondering whether to suspend Johnson immediately after 
impeachment, and thereby deprive him of power, or to wait for· 
the Senate trial to be completed. Intensity of publio feeling 
22 
was given as a good reason for waiting on the trial. Henry J. 
Raymond of lhe New York Times admitted, "if it is the deter-
mination of two or three members of the House to carry out a 
ooncooted scheme of impeachment, then the subJect so far as 
23 
the House is concerned may be considered settled in advance". 
Some hope was held out for Johnson because it was thought the 
issue would most likely never be pushed to the extremity. 
Henry J. Raymond said," The general sentiment of the country 
is already pretty distinctly pronounoed against the whole 
24 
proJect of impeachment•" The Boston Transcript, while zealous-
ly advocating impeachment gives a good idea of the main ob-
stacle. "The Constitution is very plain on the subject of ia-
25 
peachment, and yet the people seem not to understand". 
22. 
23. 
24, 
25. 
The Chic~o Daily Tribune, January 18, 1867. 
The New ork Times, January 8, 1867. 
Ib1(., January 15, 1867. 
The Boston TransoriRt, January 25, 1867. 
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E.L. Godkin discussed this problem in several issues of 
The Nation, and while condemning the President for his speech-
es and vetoes, admitted that impeachment was no remedy for the 
situation, He said," His sophistry is of the half-simple kind, 
like smart young men who sharpen their wits by debating on the 
26 
worst side". Nevertheless,impeaohment appeared to him to be 
a much greater evil than Johnson's continuance in oftice, as 
is shown in the following remazk:- " Mr. Johnson is a very 
narrow-minded person, who has concluded that;he is the govern-
ment, and the sole business of Congress is to vote money or 
27 
care for details", yet his impeachment,we believe,n will be a 
great and lasting calamity unless far worse offenses are com-
28 
mitted". The Nation concluded that besides arousing much 
hatred and spending money, the chief results of an impeach-
ment would be " a vast increase in the consumption of whiskey 
29 
and the use of profanity". 
Thaddeus Stevens claimed the South had been in a state of 
anarchy aow for two years, Therefo2e, circumstances demanded 
immediate action, and true to many indiGations in editorials 
prior to this, he demanded complete enfranchisement of the 
blacks in all parts of the South. The plan he prepared was 
26. The Nation , January 10, 1867. 
27. Ib14. 
28. YD!l., January 17~ 1867. 
29. !'6I1'. 
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read in the House on January 3,1867, and then went to the Re-
construction Committee, where it was made into a formal bill 
30 31 
on February 6• Some called it "hotch-potch legislation", and 
others thought "it cannot be possihle that the intelligent 
masses of our countrymen will long submit to be mislead by 
32 
such transparent partisan artifices". The Lexington Observer 
and Reporter said, " It is a highhanded aot of tyranny; pure, 
33 
unadulterated military despotism". Mr. Rhodes maintained that 
"Stevens carried his bill through an unwilling House; a strong 
minority of his own party was opposed to it largely for the 
34 
reason that pure military rule was unpalatable". Opinion ex-
pressed by lhe Boston Transcript exalts Congressional leader-
ship in the folaowing way:- " It is to the credit of the pres-
ent Congress that great questions are so well discussed, and 
35 
matters treated with such statesman like ability", and added 
" the members of Congress represent the great dominant senti-
36 
ment of loyal people in regard to the late rebellion". Judging 
from James G. Blaine's account of the Congressional debates 
the question was well discussed, b~t after potent remarks were 
30. 
31. 32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
Oberholtzer, Vol. I. pp. 429-430. 
The New York World, February 22, 1867. 
The National rntel1igencer, January 25, 1867. 
The Lexington Observer and Reporter, February 9,1867. 
Rhodes, Vol. VI. p.l4. 
The Boston Transori~t, January 30, 1867. 
Ibid., February 6, 867. 
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made, the same men who made them were impotent in attempting 
37 
to stop Stevens. ~ .• Raymond,editor of The New York Times, 
opposed the bill in a vigorous speech and ended by saying," be-
cause we cannot devise anything of a civil nature adequate to 
the emergency, it is urged that we must fly to the most violent 
38 
measure the ingenuity of man can devise". General Garfield 
declared that the South had been given plenty of time to act, 
and they had acted by returning the Fourteenth Amendment with 
contempt. George Boutwell's remarks are interesting when com-
pared with writings of later years. He said, " there are eight 
million people writhing under cruelties and injustices because 
39 
of EKeoutive favors toward rebellious states". Juhn w. Burgess 
called the entire Reconstruction Act " the most brutal propo-
sition ever introduced into the Congress of the united States 
40 
by a responsible committee". Congress could see grave dis-
orders in the South so long as political authority was uncer-
tain there, but after this was granted, nothing was done to 
prevent a period of outrageous government, unsurpassed in the 
history of our country. Chicago's "Copperhead" journal paid 
a tribute to Stevens over thls bill in the following way:-
"Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, that pure and immaculate patriot, lofty 
and uncorruptible statesman, that cloven-footed representative 
37. James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Comgress,Norwich,Connect-
icut, 1886, p.254. 
38. Ibid. 
39. !O!a. (New York,l907) p.ll4. 
40. 17W7 Burgess,Reconstruction and the Constitution, 
r 
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41 
of Hell 1 s disorders, is about to open our eyes". 
A Northern journal expressed indignation that the Chief 
Executive should have vetoed the Reconstruction Bill when "the 
distinguishing of it is the employment of military power in 
the interest of right and justice". rrot only that,but "the 
President had the meanness and effrontery in his veto message 
to say the negroes do not want to vote, and that the bill it-
42 
self is almost an excuse for secession". Blaine reports that 
James A. Garfield made the following utterance in c•ngress 
while debating the Reconstruction Bill:-" I want this Congress 
to giv~ its command to the President of the united States, 
and then perhaps, some impeachment hunters will have a chance 
43 
to impeach him. They will if he does not obey". A survey •• 
editorials includes the varying mpinion quite well. E.L. God-
kin Joined Garfield in his impeachment remarks in the be~ief 
that " unpunished nullification of the Congressional Acts 
44 
would be as evil as impeachment". Therefmre, all that would 
save Johnson was complete submission to Congress, and a steady 
effort to exeoute the Military Act properly. The righteous 
indignation of Northern joUrnals shows too well that such 
indignation is not the result of honest thinking among poli-
ticians. and their supporting newspapers. 1~. Stevens, who 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
The Chic!8o Times, January 22,1867. 
The Boston Transcri~t, March4, 1867. 
Blaine, Vol.II, P• 59. 
The Nation, March 7, 1867. 
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later demanded complete confiscation of Southern property,was 
now supported in his Military Bill. Johnson's veta was called 
" the plea of a dull advocate who has taken a side and not the 
45 
words of a statesman who regards only the ~ommonwealth". 
The Executive's supporters, and also Southern papers ex-
pressed little hope of a successful future and Stevens• Recon-
struction Bill was called "the greatest insult to common-sense 
and so the American people ever offered by a national legis-
46 
lature". In the South, affairs appeared to have settled down 
to a grim battle for mere existence. The Lexington Observer 
and Reporter thought " patient and unconsenting submission is 
the present duty of the South. !he ordeal may be terrible, but 
47 
compared to the life of the raae or nation, it will ee brief". 
Even amomg the Northern supporters, the only hope now was to 
" trust that the President will respect the action of Congress 
48 
as a settlement of the Reconstruction ~uestion". Congress 
thoroughly squelched all consideration of the veto by passing 
the Reconstruction Act through both Houses on the same day the 
49 
President returned it, Maroh2,l867. 
In his notorious "Swing-Around-The--Circle", Johnson made 
a remark later to be used against him. With regard to Federal 
45. 
46. 
47. 
4;8. 
49. 
Harpers weeklf, March 15, 1867. 
The Chicago T mea, February 8, 1867. 
The Lexington Observer and Reiorter, March 13, 1867. 
The New York Times, February 2, 1867. 
Rhodes, Vol. VI, p. 47. 
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office-holders in many positions he said; " God being willing, 
I will kiok them out. I will kick them out just as fast as I 
50 
oan". He had not done this, and McCUlloch declares it is his 
chief fault during this crisis of his life that he had not re-
moved some Federal men. MoCullooh says, "forl. the first time in 
his life, he manifested indecision, and when he did act, he 
51 
acted unwisely". Johnson was under pressure from some of his 
friends to make a complete change of Cahinet. Francis P. Blair 
plead for a complete change of persomnel, and thought " no 
one oould refuse to aid in the effort to lift the govg~n~ent 
above revolutionary factions to save the Constitution". Con-
gress used the loosely spoken words of Johnson as one proof of 
a need to protect Federal office-holders. A law was passed 
which prevented him from doing what he should have done long 
before this time and his usual habit of speaking loosely only 
added to the downfall. 
Editorial writing plainly indicates that there was nothing 
to do now but execute the requirements of Congressional 
53 
Reconstruction. One man was more responsible for this,perhaps, 
than any other in the Cabinet, and that man was Edwin M. 
Stanton, Secretary of War. Time after time his opposition had 
been proved and clearly shown against the Executive Plan. 
50. Oberholtzer, Vol. I. p.437. 
51. McCulloch, p. 391. 
52. Milton, p.386. 
53. Thesis, p.7 (notes, 45-46, Chapter I.) 
He wrote the third Reoonstruotion Act whiah pas~ed over John-
54 
son's veto, July 19,1867, and argued strenously against John-
son's veto of the Distriot of Columbia Suffrage Bill. Welles 
brands him as an opponent, and proves that he had started 
planning against Presidential Reoonstruction before Lincoln's 
55 . 
death. It is not neoessary here to prove that he was guilty 
o~ malevolent deoeit or gross faults of any nature. McOullooh 
says quite plainly that it was an agreement from the wery 
beginning of Johnson's administration that eaoh Cabinet member 
was to give his services " untf.l the President saw fit to dis-
56 
pense with them". This was not only a gentlemen's agreement 
made at the first meeting with Mr. Johnson, but it was also 
the reoognized precedent of Executive authority in our nation-
al government. If a President finds his Secretary of War "bold, 
57 
resourceful and defiant," with regard to his fundamental plans, 
he oertainly is under no obligation to submit his entire 
authority in order to save that individual a plaoe in the Cab-
inet. 
Congress plaoed an obstaole in the way of suoh ohange by 
passing a Tenure-of-Office-Act on Maroh 2, 1867, whioh re-
quired the o~nsent of the Uhited)States Senate in dismissing 
54. John Spenoer Bassett, A Short History of the United States 
New York,l92!,p.6l!. 
55. Thesis, Chapter I 
56. MoCullooh, p. 376. 
57. Bassett, p. 611. 
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a Cabinet officer. Arguments in behalf of this measure were 
nothing short of ludicrous. The Chicago Daily Tribune argued 
tt 
that there was never a time more auspicious than the present 
for suoh a bill as this. It lifts Federal men from dependency 
58 
and assure them of work. Above all, it is no party measure". 
If these arguments weee basioa~ly sound, then the Tenure-of-
Office-Act was a sort of Civil Servioe Reform, but it appears 
tha.t it did not pl'oduoe quite that effect in giving securi t7 
to Federal men. The Nation held that " the Tenure-of-Offioe 
bill is one of the most valuable of those oaused by Mr. John-
son's folly. Its enactment with or without .z. Johnson's 
59 
signature is now assured, fol' which we l'ejoice"• An inevitable 
struggle and it was now possible to openly insult the Presi-
dent, break the established precedent foroe him to retain 
Cabinet officers against his will, or even impeach him. 
Since Reconstruction was working so powerfully through the 
halls of Congress, Thaddeus Stevens decided to advocate con-
fiscation of property in the South. A proposal of this type 
indicates some of the fundamental patriotism and Constitution-
al authority upon whioh certain Radicals were working. Journals 
friendly to the Ralioals would not uphold suoh a violent 
measure. In the opinion of The Nation,,"had anybody proposed 
58. The Chioago Daily Tribune, January 21, 1867. 
59. The Nation, Febl'uary 1, 1867. 
r 
I 
such a bill to the Sultan of Turkey, he would have been ex-
pelled as a ruthless visionary. The mere discussion is an 
60 
affliotion to the country". The Boston Transcript thought, 
"Thaddeus Stevens' grand scheme of spoliation by law was more 
61 
like Genghis Khan or Tamerlane". Mr. Stevens, in the face of 
such remarks, made a renewed effort, and the Chicago Daill 
Tribune offered a real, forceful argument in opposing him. 
"The South is already poverty-stricken, with three-fourths of 
the live stock killed, money and banks wiped~out, fifty per 
cent of the young men slain, credit abolished, and nothing but 
disorder and chaos is left. No, 1~. Stevens, Nol The Republic 
62 
Party's object is first Justice and then Peace". 
People of the reconstruction era seemed to be impressed by 
arguments brought forth from washington, Jefferson, and other 
early Wmerican leaders. Washington's farewell address was 
~uoted in behalf of the South by The Lexington Observer and 
REporter." One of the expedients of party government to ac-
quire influence within a particular district is to misrepresen 
63 
the opinions and aims of other districtsn. Thomas Jefferson 
also made some remarks in his first inaugural address whioh 
seemed to agree with Southern viewpoints. " The minority 
possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, 
60. Ibid., l~ch 21, 1867. 
61. ~oston Transcript, May, 29, 1867. 
62. The Ofiicago Daily Tribune, November 2, 1867. 
63. The texing~on Observer and Reporter, March 6, L867. 
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64 
and which to violate would be oppression". Southern people 
were resigned to the new rule and believed, " the only hope 
of the Republic lies in the speedy restoration of the con-
quered states and the return of a sufficient number of con-
servative Representatives and Senators to put a check on the 
reckless partisan ambitions of the men now holding the reins 
65 
of power". The oppressive nature of Mr. Steven's work was 
recognized by the North as well as by the South, and even by 
some Radicals. 
Gideon Welles writes on July 17, 1867, that MZ, Stevens 
merely sneered at those who held his hills were fundamentally 
unconstitutional. Welles aoeused him of regarding the Consti-
tution as " no more obligatory than the resolutions of last 
66 
year's Party Convention". " This is the spirit and feeling of 
67 
the " Great Commoner", the Radical leader". George w, Julian 
expresses somewhat the same opinion, and it must be remembered 
here that Mr. Julian was a Radical, opposed to the nomination 
68 
of Lincoln and Johnson, and heartily in favor of negro suff-
69 
rage all through the conflict of reconstruction. He thought 
" statesmanship was sacrificed to party management", and that 
64. Ibid., 1mrch 16, 1867. 
65. The Chicago Times, March 18, 1867. 
66. Welles, v61. III. p. 133. 
67. Ibid. 
68. JU!ran, p. 243. · 
69. Ibid., chapter 12(entire chapter). 
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the Military Bill vetoed by!~. Johnson, was "utterly in-
70 
defensible on principle". " It was complttely at war with the 
genius an4 spirit of democratic government. The entire bill 
was a conression of Congressional incompetence to deal with a 
71 
problem which Congress alone had the right to solve". Mr. 
Julian contends, along with his fellow Radicals, that Coneress 
alone had the right to solve this reconstruction problem, hut 
he also admits that Congressional was merely the " abolish-
ment of civil government entirely, and the installation of 
72 
military power". Later on in his remarks, he shows that his 
chief concern was still suffrage, and probably the reason he 
said many of these things was because the blacks were not yet 
in control of the ballot, as the following statement indicates; 
" The Bill was a legislative solecism. It left the ballot in 
the hands of white rebels, and did not confer it upon the 
73 
black loyalists". 
Arguments over Constitutional Reconstruction occupy:~ good-
ly portion of the newspaper editorials theoughout the summer 
of 1867. The mass of people had the opportunity to read many 
statements of sound thinking, with the usual amount of parti-
sanship thrown in by various papers. Colonel Forney, of the .. 
washington Chronicle, in an articie headed " Thaddeus Stevensr 
70. Ibid., p.306. 
71. 11rQf., p.307. 
7 2 • "f6'l(t'. 
7 3. "!'6n'. 
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r 
made the prophetic statement "that future generations will 
rise up and bless the man,who,opposing a treacherous President, 
passed over his vetoes those measures of reconstruction 
necessary to secure the results of war and freedom to the peop:. 
74 
le". The Radical, George w. Julian, repudiated such an idea, 
and James Ford Rhodes, not a pro-Johnson writer at all, says, 
" Stevens obtained his majority for the reconstruction bills 
7 
by saeaasm, taunts, dragooning, and by cracking the party whip. 
Such methods are not necessarily a part of Constitutioaal pro-
cedure, but the Northern papers began a campaign to bfand 
Johnson's opposit~&n to them as contrary to the Constituttnn. 
The Chicago Daily Tribune summarized this opinion as follows:-
" He assumes he is supporting the flag and the Constitution 
when he delays and defeats loyal men in the South in their 
76 
right to vote. The issue was decided in 1866". 
Presidential support was sufficient to balance part of this 
in the public mind, and at least part of the people saw some 
indications that 1~. Johnson was not destroying the entire 
Constitution. The National Intelligencer thought " the most 
ludicrous inconsistency observable in the efforts of the hand-
ful of Radical agitators is the enfranchisement of aegroes 
7 
and the disfranchisements of many-Yhites, including foreigner~ 
74. The Washington Chronicle, April 18, 1867. 
75. anodes, Vol. VI. P• 17. 
76. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 19, 1867. 
77. The National Intelligencer, May,l, 1867. 
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According to The Lexington Observer and Reporter, " this 
faction, having usurped the government, has demoralized the 
public sentiment and taught that ab&ve the Constitution is the 
78 
will of the maJority". It began to be apparent to many that if 
the Union was the chief aim and sole obJect of the war, then t 
the prolonged delay in restoring the South was quite a contra-
diction in itself. The New York World state&, " Tennessee has 
been admitted, while other states are held under military 
authority. This is perfidy to the states, and a violation of 
79 
the Constitution". 
Northern sympathizers looked upon the Military Bill as an 
immense work to be carried out for the good of America. ~ 
Washington Chronicle decided that, " we must nationalize this 
agitation in support of the new Commission to carry out its 
80 
work. We do this because of principles which are right". All 
speeches, appointments and general action of the President 
were watched for signs of opposition. In a speech of July 25, 
81 
he said he would " never willingly execute the law", meaning 
the last ~econstruotion Act. Rumors also spread abroad that 
General Sheridan was to be removed from his command in the 
south. His removal was interpreted as " pure spite, the spite 
of an obstinate ,aan or a sort of stupid self-assertion of 
78. 
79. 
so. 
81. 
The 
The 
The 
The 
Lexiygton Observer and Re!orter, April 6, 1867. 
New ork World, JUly 12, 867. 
Washington Chronicle, April 30, 1867. 
Nation, July 25, 18~7. 
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Constitutional powers belonging to the President, which, Mr. 
82 
Johnson conceives, Congress has been encroaching upon". On 
July 4, the President made another address which, like most of 
those he made, did not fail to make some choice remarks for 
the opposition to use against him. He describes his way of 
arriving at eoAolusions in politics-- namely, n First of all, 
83 
be convinced that you are right". The Radicals met such a 
statement by quoting it against the President, and then exp 
pressing their intentions of " beginning reconstruction at the 
very first stages", and if the delay seems fraught with injury 
to the South,n the responsibility for this must fall upon the 
President and his rebel cohorts, who have endeavoured to trick 
84.. 
the nation out of its rights". 
The impoverished South looked upon these proceedings with 
humiliation, but remained helpless to do much to relieve the 
situation. There are significant hints as to future develop-
ments in the Uhited States in some of the Southern editorials 
that are refreshing in the midst of daily slander, criticism, 
or disgusting party politics. The opinions stated show a view-
point and includes all of America and an attempt to see the 
nation as a growing power. In the opinion of The Lexington 
Observer and Reporter, n ~he p~an of the Radicals could never 
82. Ibid. 
83. ~washington Chronicle, June 25, 1867. 
Ibid. ( 84) 
r 
have been accomplished b~t for the active assistance of our 
growing North West. Her leading citizens, former New Englan4-
ers,have control of the new states of the ~orthwest and led 
them in blind submission behind lmssachusetts. The future 
destinies a.ee not bound up with New Engla.ad, for the West and r:; 
South will be united on the great questions of policy looming 
before us. While the others fight over the negro, New England 
85 
is gathering the rioh spoils of high tariff into her coffers". 
The most noticeable change in the editorial support of John-
son during the summer of 1867 i·s the attitude of opposition 
taken by Henry J. Raymond in The New York Times. For some 
time, this paper had counseled moderation on Johnson's part, 
and now that the Reconstruction Acts ~re United St&tes law, 
it was thought to be " a matter of sacred duty that he should 
be receptive of the opinions of others, rather than over--tena-
cious of his own. The President will commit a very grave mis-
take if he interrupts this steady and acceptable operation of 
86 
the law". The New York Times editorials make it quite plain 
that Johnson must carr~ out the entire Congressional program, 
and adds, n neither the President nor anybody else will have 
the power, even if he has the wish, to areest the beneficent 
87 
work the Recoastruction Bill was designed to accomplish". 
85. The Lexi~ton Observer and Re~orter, August 14, 1867. 
86. The New prk Times~ June 15, 867. 
87. fii4., J'\i17 3, 186 • 
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88 
The Presidential plan was described as " crude and incomplete", 
and even in the execution of the Reconstruction Bill, more 
confidence was placed in General Grant than in Johnson. "To 
this quarter we look for the· efficiency and peace which are 
89 
most unwisely denied by President Johnson". " Mr. Johnson's 
career during the last few months has shown that he cannot 
appreciate moderation, and that forbearance does nothing but 
90 
feed his arrogance". 
Most pt the month of August, 1867, is taken up with the re-
moval of Edwin M. Stanton. Johnson argued that the Tenure-of-
Office-Act " does not apply to Cabinet officers appointed by 
91 
my predecesso*"· Stanton was accused of " clinging to office 
92 
like a coward clings to life". The New York World held that 
circumstances furnished solid grounds for removal of Cabinet 
93 
officers, an4 a mandamus would be effective in this case". It 
is quite evident that the Tenure-of-Office-Act was not passed 
to meet a general need, for " as a matter of fact Johnson has 
been far froa free and indiscriminate in the removal of office 
holders, even though their antagonism was carried to offensive 
94 
lengths". McCulloch wrote to Samue~ J. Tilden in October,l866: 
" The President desires to make as few changes as possible, 
88. Ibid., July 27, 1867. 
89. !Dr[., July 31, 1867. 
90. TOri., August 29, 1867. 
91. ~New York World, August 7, 1867. 
92. !bia. 
93. !Dft., August 8, 1867. 
94. McCulloch, p. 377. 
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and none on political grounds, unless it was clear that the 
interests of the service ot the interests of the administra-
95 
tion are to be certainly benefited by them". E.L. Godkin said, 
" the actionso~ I~. Johnson towards the Secretary of War afford 
no grounds in themselves for vehement censure; but as an indi-
96 
cation of his stubbornness they deserve emphatic condemnation". 
The President had waited too long tor this move, and his at-
tempt to remove Stanton in 1867 only made the effort appear to 
be obstinacy rather than honest policy. No matter what the 
Constitutional grounda were, Johnson failed to use any taot or 
decisive action until such action was no longer possible. His 
friend,, McCulloch, testifies to this when he says, " Johnson 
knew when the Tenure-of.Office- Bill was before Congress that· 
the object of its leading supporters was to tie his hands, and 
yet he refrained from using them when they were·.,rfree. He mani-
fested weakness and indecision, and when he did aot, he aoted 
97 
unwisely". 
The opposition lost no time in condemning Stanton's removal. 
From The Boston Transcript oame the remark, " Johnson has 
accomplished one thing by his removal of Stanton; one more 
98 
revelation of his wrong-headedness". The New York Post called 
Stanton " one of the most faithful, capable, upright public 
95. Oberholtzer, Vol. I. P• 438. 
96. The Nation, August 22, 1867. 
97. McdUilooh, p. 391. 
98. The Boston Transcript, August 12, 1867. 
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99 
servants this nation has ever had". The President opened the 
way for the very thing the Radicals wanted to use as condem-
nation. By removing Stanton, it appeared he was attemptiag to 
" modify the effeot of the Reoonstruotion Acts in ohanging the 
100 
War Department". When the Tenure-of-Office Aot was up before 
Congress, editorials in the Ntrth defended it as a muoh needed 
reform measure, and oarefully explained how it would benefit 
101 
our government. The Chicago Daily Tribune offers some interest-
ing explanations concerning the bill,now that it had become a 
law, and such remarks could no longer hinder its enactment. 
"The Tenure-of-Office Aot was enacted expressly to meet the 
perverseness of Andrew Johnson, and probably four-fifths of 
those who voted for it believed they were taking measures to 
prevent the President from removing Mz. Stanton and filling 
102 
his plaoe with a rebel sympathizer". 
So far a~ the North was oonoerned, he was displaying a 
stubborn insolence in even so much as questioning this measure, 
while in the South he appeared to be given to entirely too 
muoh delay. A Kentucky journal expressed satisfaotion that"the 
President has at last summoned energ·y enough to maintain his 
99.The New York Post, New York City, August 12, 1867. 
100. The Boston Transcript, August 24, 1867. 
101. Thesis, ehapter IV. Notes, 57-58. 
102. The Chioago Daily Tribune, August 3, 1867. 
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own authority. Stanton the bully, has been ignominiously ex-
103 
pelled from the Cabinet". This Lexington Observer and Repor~er 
upheld Mr. Johnson throughout and its criticism was severe 
with regard to Radicals, but the editor gives Edwin M. Stanton 
credit, even while rejoicing in his downfall. " Stanton dis-
plarsd shrewd percept, knowledge and skill to paralyze the 
opposition. He has been overthrown by one his inferior in all 
104 
save lawful authority". The President created one more avail-
able point against himself by suspending M%. Stanton, rather 
than removing him. He was then accused o# oraering Stanton's 
removal after the Unite4 States Senate had refused to suspend 
him, and this opened the way for his impeachment under the 
Tenure-of-Office Act. Public opinion in both North and South 
was rapidly gaining force against him. Welles shows a more 
intimate viewpoint, which the public, however, could not 
know or read fD~ several years. In his diary he tells of a 
conversation held with the President on August 5, 1867. In 
speaking of Stanton, Johnson remarked: " It is impossible to 
get along with such_, a man in such a position, and I can stand 
it no longer--- to think that the man whom I have trusted was 
105 
plotting and intriguing against me". 
Some rather interesting political motives appear with regard 
103. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, August 17, 1867. 
104. !bid. 
105. wer!es, Vol. III, P• 157. 
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to impeachment during the latter part of 1887. Preceding the 
October elections of 1867, The Chicago Daill Tribune constant-
ly harangued Johnson and demanded impeachment. On August 21, 
tt published this decisive statement: " The country has en-
dured Andrew Johnson as long as endurance can be ooun ted a 
vi~tue 9 There are reasons in law now, and let Congress put him 
106 
out". Down to the first Tuesday in October, The Chioago Daily 
Tribune was almost rabid in ij;s demands for impeachment, and 
then, by Deoember 2, 1867, the sentiment had so far ohanged as 
to denounce immediate impeachment as " madness and folly 
107 
sponsored only by men of dwarfed vision". One reason to prompt 
suoh a change was a turn toward conservatism as indioated in 
108 
the fall elections. The Democrats and "Copperheads" also re-
pudiated Johnson at this time, and made him so thoroughly sub-
dued in power that little political harm could result by 
leaving him alone, while a great deal might happen if impeaoh-
ment proceedings proved a failure. 
Three Northern jpurnals summarize4 the opinion in the follo 
ing manner. According to The New York Times, " the general 
feeling is that Mr. Johnson'e:hands are tied already and the 
oountry will outlive his term of office. The removal may be 
essential to the success of a Jresidential game, but vital 
106. The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 21, 1867. 
107. The chicago Times, beoember 2, 1867. 
108. oberholtzer, vo!. r. p.479. 
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interests of the nation cannot be sacrificed to promote a 
l09 
faction". The New York World said, n by its bold acts, Congres 
has virtually passed sentence upon the President, in advanoe o 
formal charges,and wmthout evidence. They have taken from him 
the command of the army, removal of officers, and demand that 
he shall understand t"1e Constitution in the way they choose 
110 
to put it", while Harpers Weekly deolared," we believe that 
public sentiment would justify impeachment, but it is for the 
jud.ciary committee to determine whether the case can be pre-
111 
sented so as to make conviction a moral certainty". 
A coming Presidential election caused one more change 
toward Johnson among Northern journals9 The Chi•ago Times 
turned against him after the October elections of 1867, and 
criticised his speeches, motives and general administration. 
" The Johnson administration allows demagogues to undermine 
the state, the finanoial burdens increase, industry languishes, 
ani the Democracy regard Mr. Johnson as responsible to the 
people for this state of affaias. He has fallen between two 
stools, from whioh awkward situation we do not propose to 
rescue himt In his sp,eohes, Mr. Johnson has done nothing but 
109. The New York Times. November 26, 1867. 
110. The New York World, December 9, 1867. 
111. Harpers Weekly, October 5, 1867. 
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strengthen the power of the Republicans by exoiting popular 
112 
contempt for himself". This oaused rejoicing in The Chicago 
Daily Tribune oolumns, and according to that paper Johnson was 
113 
" in the last ditch". "Andrew Johnson has reached the lowest 
depths to which any human being could descend in the estate of 
114 
mankind:- 'The Copperheads' 1efuse him" 1 
Republican papers in the North are in agreement as to the 
impeac~~ent question at the end at 1867, and no matter what aad 
been said before, or what actually happened later, editorial 
statements are quite definitely against it in December. Henry 
Raymond believed, " the country will rejoice at the summary 
dismissal of this wild scheme of personal ~alice, because we 
regard the President as beyond the reach of political redemp-
115 
tion, anyhow". And other papers thought, " the impeachment has 
never been more than the whim ot a few. It has never been 
sanotioned by the intelligent judgment of the oountry, and we 
116 
do not believe it will be sanctioned by Congress". This state-
ment of Harpers Weekly directly contradicts the opinion pub-
lished in that same journal on October 2, 1867, when the edi-
tor said, " we believe that public sentiment would justify 
117 
impeaohment",and is one example of the change some journals 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
117. 
lhe Chicago Times, October 12, 1867. 
The chicago Daily Tribune, November 14, 1867. 
Ibid. 
The New York Times, December 2, 1867. 
Har~ers weekly, December 14, 1867. 
!bl ., October 2, 1867. 
had made by this time. The Chicago Daily Tribune felt relieved 
fhat impeachment charges fell in the first attempt before the 
House by a vote of 108 to 57 and added," Thus that source of 
mischief falls, to be troublesome no moee, for a few months 
will dismiss Mr. Johnson to the obscurity of Tennessee plan-
118 
tation life, whence he ought never to have emerged". 
Since the October elections of 1867 showed a decided trend 
toward the Democratic party they therefore united Radicals 
and Conservatives in Congress in preparation for the Presi-
dential electioa. This effect was diiastrous to the welfare of 
Johnson if the Radicals aimed to impeachhhim, and Oberholtzer 
aays,"the leaders in the House needed no goadingto arouse 
their energiesV Every detail of the plot to place the Presi-
dent in a position from which he could not extricate himself 
had been arranged. Stanton had played his part bluffly and 
arrogantly, while Grant had become an instrument to serve the 
The Nation thought n it was by no means improb-
119 
party ends". 
120 
able that the Democrats might elect their next President". 
And such a contingency as that immediately united the Re-
publican ranks. The paramount sentiment now seemed to be cen-
121 
tered on impeac~~ent as a means of saving the party. The two-
t : .. :.i. 
thirds majority in Congress was-safe until March 4, 1869, and 
118. The Chicago Daily Tribune, December 9, 1867. 
119. Oberholtzer, Vol. r. p.494. 
120. The Nation, December 9, 1867. 
121. Rhodes, Vol. VI. P• 93. 
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" in the mean time it must be used so that a Republioan Presi-
dent should be eleoted in 1868. There was no thought ot tUl'n-
122 
ing baok as a response to pub11o sentiment". 
122. ~., p. 94. 
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aHAPTER V 
Reconst~uction following the Ame~ican Civil War included 
not only a resto~ation of the seceded states, but also a finan 
oial readjustment. Conditions demanded action, and with nation 
al affai~s ins.a preoa~ious state, Cong~ess and President spent 
most of the time in battling with one anothert A national debt 
of ,~ 2,846,000,000, o~ $ 74.28 per capita confronted the gov-
e~nment, and the taxes suppo~ting this debt were the heaviest 
that ~re levied in any civilized oount~y in the wo~ld, amount 
l 
ing to $11.46 in gold fo~ every inhabitant of the land. The 
histo~ian Muzzey explains the difficulty in secuzing aid by 
means of the Amerioan Party system, and shows the absurd con-
dition into whloh the United States political organization has 
fallen in past years. He says, " A vote cast aaainst a Repub-
lican candidate fo~ the humblest office ln any village was a 
vote cast for treason. Under such conditions lt was impossible 
to get any political issue like the tariff, the currency,or 
. 2 
the pat~onage considered purely on its merits". on the other 
hand, if Congress had a sufficient majo~ity in the Republican 
ranks to ove~~ide vetoes, then even with a recaloit~ant P~esi­
dent, it still could have passed legislation regarding finan~ 
cial ~econst~uction and aided the enti~e nation. James Fo~d 
Rhodes says, " the essential fact was that Cong~ess gove~ned 
1. David MUzzey, The Ame~ican Adventure, Vol. II. New York, 
2. ~·• P• 24. 1927, P• 23. 
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the country and was sustained by publia sentiment at the 
North, So far as the policy of reconstruction was concerned, 
3 
Congress had nearly reduced the President to impotence". Evi-
dently,then, the ~allure to reconstruct national finanaes 
could not be placed upon Johnson's shoulders with any degree 
of justice. 
Editorials expressed a vigorous demand for something be-
sides a constant battle between the Executive and Congress. Mr 
Henzy Raymond, of The New York Times said, n Congress must 
at once direct itself to those great vital questions bearing 
upon public interests-- retrenchment, taxation, regulation of 
4 
public burdens and establishment of sound financial principles. 
The New York World accused Congress of legislating with Re-
publican ascendancy in mind,and warned that " it remains for 
the people of the united States to say whether thay oan afford 
to have a country ruined to keep a moribund political party on 
5 
its legs for four years longer". The National Intelligencer 
held no hope for Congressional action regarding financial 
matters, and thought " it is already evident and indeed under-
stood that Congress does not seriously intend to touch the 
6 
financial question during the present session", and aontinued 
by reminding people that " while the best interests of the 
3. Rhodes, Vol. VI. P• 71. 
4. The New York Times, January 6, 1868. 
5. The New York World, January 2, 1868. 
6. The National Intelligencer, January 2, 1868. 
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nation ~e thus wantonly and wickedly negleated, with suffer-
ing in the North and sorrow in the South, millions are wrung 
from oppressed taxpayers in order to support milit~y despo-
7 
tiams". 
Opposition to Johnson was not diminished by;.··the absolute 
failure of Congress to aacomplish any financial legislation, 
and The Chicago Daily Tribune aarried ita program of oppositio 
including abolition of privileged classes and freedom of b~-
8 
dened classes, whiah literally meant Republiaan supremaay in 
Southern politics. This newspaper accused Johnson of " obsti-
9 
nately, maliciously and aruelly" defeating the will of C<hngres 
and thereby prolonging the military rule over people in South-
ern States. Horace Greeley gave a typical politiaal interpre-
tation from the Republiaan standpoint in the following way:-
" Mr. Johnson's quarrel with Congress was premeditated, and 
was impelled by his early determination to break with and 
make war upon the Republican party. Mr. Johnson is exerting 
all his influence to obstruct and defeat Congressional Recon-
10 
struction". The Boston Transcript appealed to business inter-
ests of Ameriaa to beware of suoh a man as Andrew Johnson,who 
had shown -imself to be reckless and unfaithf~ in his polit-
ical life, and argued that after the removal of the President 
7. Ibid. 
8. me-chicago Daily Tribune, January 20, 1868. 
9. Ibid., January I, 1868. 
10.~ New York Tribune, January 15, 1868. 
" the people will settle down to a season of financial and 
mercantile prosperity such as has not been known since Andrew 
Johnson determined to subdue Congress and constitute himself 
11 
as the sole governing power in the Union". 
Editorials in The New York World attributed the enormous 
expenses of governmental affairs to the Republican policy in 
Southern States, and claimed that " a multitude of crippling 
taxes could be removed if the lavish waste in holding the 
12 
South in terror be eliminated". Mr. Henry Raymond's editorial 
reflect several~changes toward Andrew Johnson during the ae-
oonstruction period, and as election time approached in 1868, 
he defended the Republican policy, especially with regard to 
the Freedmen's Bureau. On September 8, 1868, an editorial in 
The New York Times gave the cost of the Freedmen's Bureau 
from January 1, 1865 to August 1, 1868. This total cos; was 
$ 6, 377,251. Mr. Raymond declared " this was a mere pittance 
to be spent for four million people, yet Democrats argue 
13 
lavish extravagance"! An interesting statement of the pro-John 
son opinion is given in The National Intelligencer, January 4, 
1868. " If the plan of reconstruction proposed by Mr. Lincoln 
and adopted by Mr. Johnson had been accepted and carried out 
to its natural conclusion, the condition of the country would 
11. The Boston Transcript, February 28, 1868. 
12. The New York World, January 9, 1868. 
13 .The New York Tlmes,September 8, 1868. 
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be one of peace and prosperity. This policy,however, did not 
14 
suit the aims of political agitators". Then the editor summa-
rized the exact reasons why unnecessary expense was accumulat-
ing, by saying," the military satrapies in the Sout~ the 
Freedmen's Burea~ and the whole army of office-holders and 
plunderers fatten at public expense. This political machinery 
costs our country one-hundred million dollars per year in 
order that the Radical program of Sumner, Stevens and their 
15 
submissive satellites may be supported". 
Horace Greeley declared that " the House and Senate are 
doing nobl7, while the President threatens anarchy", and added, 
16 
" we must reconstruct the South in spite o~ the President". 
On the same day Mr. Greeley's statement appeared in The New 
York Tribune,(January 4,1868) The New York Times described the 
latest example of Congressional actioa. The chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee in the House, Mr. Wilson of Iowa, proposed 
a bill which required that two-thirds of the Supreme Court 
Justices should declare themselves in favor of a decision made 
by the Court before that decision should become binding. Mr. 
Raymond thought " the military dictatorship and the late in-
vasion of the Supreme Court have proved to be a sorry fUlfill-
ment of the popular expectation, and the effect is most 
14. The National Intelligencer, January 4, 1868. 
15. Ibid., 
16. The New York Tribune, January 14, 1868. 
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17 
disastrous on the country". Furthermore, " the advocates of 
the proposed law do not conceal the faot that the object of its 
enacjment is to prevent a judgment by the Couzt adverse to the 
18 
Reconstruction Acts", Although this bill never became a law, 
it is a positive indication of the feeling then existing among 
the departments of our national government, and shows to what 
lengths Congress might go in order to maintain its authority. 
Ii is a difficult task for Congressmen to answer certain 
queries, and a good example of such is to be found in The Nat-
ional Intelligencer for January,20, 1868. This paper concludes 
that " after seven years of unprecedented sway, during which 
time the Radical majorities in Congress have controlled and 
shaped the whole legislation, the country finds itself on the 
19 
verge of bankruptcy". According to Mr, Greeley, " our trouble 
is not that we have to reconstrucj the South, but also to re-
20 
construct the President". Yet Congress realized that public 
opinion must suppprt a final attempt to reconstruct the Presi-
dent which would necessarily mean impeachment, and E.L. Godkin 
states quite clearly in The Nation why there was reason for 
hesitating in such a move. " It cannot be said that impeachmen 
has grown mn favor with the public. In fact, the attitude all 
17. The New York Times, January 16, 1868. 
18. Ibid., January 23, 1868. 
19. The National Intelligencer, January 20, 1868. 
20. The lew York Tribune, January 27, 1868. 
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21 
along has been one of resignation rather than eagerness". 
At the beginning of February, 1868, all attention shifted 
from finances to the problem of impeachment. There was a notice 
able production of undignified language in several leading pa-
pers when Johnson was discussed, and a vigorous effort was 
quite evidently made to foster impeachment proceedings. In the 
opinion of The Chicago Daily Tribune, " the United States owed 
its very existence to Stanton and Grant, while to Andrew John-
son ~t owed nothing but the lesson that our country survives 
22 
even thosgh a scoundrel be President". Such a conservative 
magazine as the Atlantic Monthly stated that " as far back as 
the elections of 1866, ·President Johnson proved himself to be 
23 
a renegade". It is significant to note that the editor added 
in this same article that " time and events have, partially 
at least, showed that the President was not altogether wrong 
24 
in looking for a change in popular sentiment". In this state-
ment he referred to Andrew JohnsOn's appeal to the people, and 
his hope that public sentimwnt would ultimately save his polio~ 
But the policy of Lincoln, Johnson or no other President was 
of any value then, and a statement from Harpers Weekly express-
es this attitude."A President with a policy is an anomaly lnd 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
The Nation, March 5, 1868. 
The chicafo Dailt Tribune, February 10, 
The I't!an io Honnly, February, 1868. 
Ibid. 
1868. 
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25 
an absutdity in our system". 
The New York Times granted that " the Republican party in 
Congress seems to be unanimously in favor of impeachment", but 
thought " it certainly would be a very extraordinary spectacle 
to see Congress pass a law creating an offense, prescrbing a 
penalty, and then acting at once as prosecutor, ju~ge and jury 
26 
under this law". Nevertheless, Congress chose to impeach Andre 
Johnson before the Tenure-of-Office Act was declared Consti-
tutional by the Supreme Court, and on February 26, 1868, the 
House voted that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States 
be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors. The sentiment 
backr:of such a move is perhaps best shown by the editorials of 
Horace Greeley. He said, " We heartily endorse the action of 
the House. If the Republican parpy has, or ever had an enemy 
preeminently deadly and perfidious, his name is Andrew Johnson. 
He must be impeached for the good of the country, and the 
27 
people will say, 'Amen' "· On February 25, the following state-
ment appeared in The Chicago Daily Tribune. " The American 
people impeach you, Andrew Johnson, as the disturber of nation-
al peace, the violator of national law, the stumbling block of 
28 
national justice and the organizer of national ruin". 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
Harpers Weekl~, January 25, 1868. 
The New Yorklmes, February 25, 1868. 
The lew York Tribune, February 29, 1863. 
The chicago Daily Tribune, February 25, 1868. 
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Opinion was suffiaiently divided to make the outaome uncer-
tain, and this added to the vigor with which many papers 
attempted to convert public sentiment. An attempt was made to 
exert pressure upon members of the Senate, and The New York 
Worlcf severely condemned the practice by saying, "at what for-
mer period in the history of this country could it have been 
possible for the party press to have made use of threats and 
denunciations for the purpose of compelling members of the 
Senate to act in obedience to a supposed popular demand. John-
son's removal will proclaim that the Executive office is held 
by any incumbent at the party pleasure of that fact~on which 
29 
controls the legislature". Henry Raymond said, " the entire 
press, with one or two exceptions, have treated it only as a 
party matter, while Thaddeus Stevens, Ben Butler, Wendell 
Phillips, and others of the same stamp evidently believe that 
30 
the Senate can be made to bend to party necessi tiesn. 
James G. Blaine said, n In fact, there was but one charge 
of any gravity against the President--- that of violating the 
Tenure-of-Office Act. But on this charge there was a very grave 
difference o! opinion among those equally competent to deaide. 
Mr. Fessenden, one' of the ablest lawyers that had sat in the 
Senate since 1~. Webster, believed on his oath and honor-- that 
29. The New York World, Hay 11, 1868. 
30. The New York Times, March 7, 1868. 
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the President had a lawful and Constitutional right to remove 
31 
Mz. Stanton at this time and in the manner he did". Then, out-
si~e of professional opinion, there was supposed to be a popu-
lar demand for the President's aonviction. Senator Fessenden 
gave his official statement regarding such a demand." To the 
suggestion that populer opinion demands the conviction of the 
President, I reply that he is not now on trial before the 
people, but before the Senate.-- The People have not taken an 
oath to do impartial Justice according to the Const~tution 
32 
and the law. I have taken that oath". McCulloch believed that 
" it was not an impartial trial", and. when the oath was taken 
" it is undeniable that a majority of the Senators were not 
33 
prepared. to do impartial justice to the accusedn. 
If we follow George w. Julian's opinion, then 11 the popular 
feeling in fav&r of impeachment had now became formidable, and 
34 
the whole land seemed to be electrified". Julian remarked that 
n the popular feeling against the PresiCI.ent was now rapidly 
35 
nearing its climax, and becoming a sort of frenzy". Judging 
from The Cincinnati Daill Commercial there is certainly no 
eviCI.ence or such a rrenzied feeling, as may be seen in the 
31. Blaine, Vol. II. P• 379. 
32. Ibid., p. 381. 
33. McCulloch, p. 397. 
34. Julian, p. 313. 
35. Ibid., P• 314. 
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following statement; " the impeaehment trial causes very little 
excitement. The trial of Andrew Johnson is discovered to be 
very much like the trial of anybody else". This enlightening 
bit ot information is added by the same editor-- " There is 
reason to believe that about one-half of the Senators would 
vote to convict the President without evidence--- simply upon 
the speeches of Butler or eloquence of Logan, but there are 
as many as ten Senators who will be governed by the testimony 
36 
of the law". A few days later The Cincinn~ti Daily Commercial 
admitted that " it is a matter of serious doubt whether the 
impeachment of the President by the House was demanded by the 
highest considerations of public policy and the clearest in-
37 
telligence of public duty". 
After great pressure had been exerted and every effort made 
to convict Johnson, he stood acquitted on May 12, 1868t We 
may reasonably suppose that this acquittal was a relief in more 
ways than one. First of all, people were reminded that if the 
vote would be alose and Benjamin Wade cast the deciding ballot, 
38 
he would be made President by one vote, and that one , his own. 
Secondly, a great number of office-seekers had flocked to Wash-
ington expecting a sweeping change following ~a. Wade's access-
ion to office, and Republicans were quite anxious as to the 
36. The Cincinnati Dailt Commercial, April 6, 1868. 
37. Ibid., April 13, 18 8. 
38. The National Intelli~encer, March 6, 1868. 
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effects this might have upon the next Presidential election. 
McCulloch says, " it is quite olear to the minds of many men 
that nothing would be gained, and great loss might be sustained 
39 
by a change at that time and in such a manner". The New York 
Times said, " What makes Mr. Johnson's impeachment safe and 
tran~uil is the fact that he has no party to sustain him, and 
therefore public opinion has become tolerably well settled in 
the matte~. We believe that comparatively few hope for ae-
40 
quittal". The New York World remarked at the beginning of the 
trial that " one of the flagrant enormities which make im-
peachment a disgrace to the American people and a dange~ous 
assault on the structure of thei~ government is the fact that 
41 
the Senate is an interested tribunal", and Senator Wilson de-
clared " if there were doubts to vex him in the process of 
reaching that conolusion,his country would have the benefit of 
42 
those doubts, rather than the President". With political bias 
so evident,tt is little wonder that as the trial proceeded,the 
conviction grew that the impeaohwent was " Politics". 
Those Senators who dared to vote against the Radicals were 
subJected to severe criticism following the acquittal. In the 
opinion of !he Boston Transcript, " treachery in the Presiden-
tial chair may perhaps be borne for a few months, but when it 
39. McCulloch, p. 401. 
40. The New York Times, April 27, 1868. 
41. The New fork world, March 5, 1868. 
42. Oberholtzer, Vol. II. p. 138. 
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becomes infectious and spreads to the Senate chamber, public 
indignation will be aroused to a degree such as has hardly 
43 
been witnessed since the firing on Fort Sumter". Horace Greele 
had already practically his verbal resources prior to the 
trial, and when the verdiot was announced, he exclaimed," Welll 
Let Messrs. Chase, Fessenden ~1d Company tale care of their 
man Johnson, while we organize for and make certaia the joy-
44 
ful advent of Grant and Victory "• E.L.Godkin thought the whole 
affair ought to be dramatized," for it certainly would furnish 
the material for what the play-bills call a side-splitting 
45 
farce". 
Following the impeachment trial Andrew Johnson's name rapid~ 
ly became poor copy, because he was no longer in the political 
arena and public attention was now concentrated on the campaign 
of General Grant. Johnson's final message to Congress was prac-
tioally disregarded and while he remained in a comparatively 
helpless condition,the United States Congress proceeded to 
bring the bitter negro suffrage campaign to its final culmina-
tion. This came in the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
granting suffrage without respect to color. Meanwhile the Demo-
crats held their National Convention in New York City, where 
William Marcy Tweed, Fernande Wood, A. Oakey Hall and the 
43. The Boston Transcript, May 1~, 1868. 
44. The New York Tribune, May 18 , 1868. 
45. The Nation, May 21, 1868. 
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Tammany leaders served as the reception committee. With these 
names appearing on the political horizon American history 
rapidly became what F. L. Paxson termed " The New Nation". 
GRITIGAL ESSAY aN AUTHORITIES 
This essay includes manuscript source material, reminiscen-
ces, general secondary works, biographies and periodicals. 
Manuscript Source Material 
There are only a few letters available in the McCormick 
Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois, but these letters pro-
vide a very good source of information concerning private 
opinion in the South during this period. The letters included 
in this study were taken from the private correspondence of 
Judge D. Davidson, Lexington,Virginia. 
Periodicals 
The two most important weekly periodicals for a study of 
this era are Harpers Weekly (New York} and The Nation (New 
York). Under the editorial guidance of E.L. Godkin, The Nation 
became a periodical for cultured people. Ordinarily, at any 
rate, Mr. Godkin was able to see both sides of a question and 
his magazine is one of the most important and reliable sources 
used in this study. Hr. George William Curtis plaoed Harpers 
Weekly on a new plane of development, but his arguments are 
far more biased than those of The Nation, and taken as a whole 
they must be compared with standard historical writing to be 
of use in such a study as this. The Atlantio Monthly(Boston) 
offers a wide variety of opinion from business men, politi-
cians, and ministers. The editorials were written by such 
leaders as Henry Ward Beecher, Edward E. Hale and others. It 
is quite valuable as an indication of public opinion among 
leaders in the North. 
Newspapers 
Information taken from newspaper sources is necessarily 
susceptible to politival prejudice and a great deal of section-
al bias, therefore whenever possible, two papers have been 
selected from the same city or area to give a more balanced 
impressioa. The Chicago Times was a typical Northern Demo-
cratic paper whose editorials were unusually powerful, witty 
and outspoken. The Chicago Daily Tribune was constantly cam-
paigning either for negro suffrage or against Andrew Johnson. 
It was probably one of the most powerful organs of public 
opinion in the enti*e country and the material it offers is 
almost unlimited. The Cincinnati Daily Commercial offers a 
good set of editorials apparently free from extreme radicalism 
and quite sensibly written, Opinion from Washington D.C. may 
be taken from The Washington Chronicle or The National Intelli-
gencer • Colonel John w. Forney's Washington Chronicle reflects 
the effect of personal feeling between W~. Forney and Presi-
dent Johnson and is a very good example of the way one of Mr. 
Johnson's blunders reacted against him through the press. At 
the beginning The Chronicle was quite friendly to Johnson and 
it never became extremely radical. The National Intelligencer 
presents some of the most forceful ideas found anywhere in the 
press of America. It consistently supported him to the end and 
for the most part the editorials are free from political bias. 
New England sentiments are well shown in The Boston Transcript, 
which was said to have been under the control of Senator 
Charles Sumner. It is typically sectional, decidedly anti-John-
son, and a consistent upholder of Congressional plans and idea~ 
New York City naturally offers the widest range of material to 
be found in any one city of the country. The greatest of the 
New York papers was undoubtedly Mr. Henry Raymond's New York 
Times. Henry Raymond was one of the outstanding editors of hie 
day, a member of Congress, and a man who maintained his ideas 
even against the drift of public opinion. The New York Times 
is one of the very best of all the papers studied. Horace 
Greeley, edi*or of The ~ew York Tribune, was a unique figure 
in the political and editorial field of his day. He opposed 
Johnson during the entire comtest, and his opposition is far 
too important to be disregarded in a study of the reconstruct-
ion period. Andrew Johnson received strong suppprt from ~ 
New York World, and yet we must regard material from this 
paper as somewhat less reliable than that found in t~. Ray-
mond's paper. It is biased in favor of Johnson. Of all the 
papers for this era The Baltimore Sun is as consistent; 
brilliant and exceptional in every way as any to found in 
either North or South. It offers some unusually good arguments, 
and even though pro-Johnson throughout, it is characterized 
by sane, well-balanced editorial writing. The Lexington 
Observer and Reporter (Lexington,Kentuoky) went to such ex-
tremes from time to time that it was threatened with suppress-
ion. It was decidedly Southern in viewpoint, and very open in 
its denunciation of Congress. However, editorials are so inter-
esting and well written that there can be n6 doubt as to the 
influence this paper exerted. The Connecticut Herald ( New 
Haven, Connecticut) was a typical Yankee journal. To this 
paper, impeachment was always necessary, and there was little 
evidence of any viewpoint other than that of New England. 
Material is quite abundant in its editorial columns, and its 
value lies in the faot that it gives us a good sectional view. 
Biographies 
Robert w. Winston's biographY of Andrew Johnson,Plebeian 
and Patriot, New York,l928, is a good one-volume work to be 
used in a study of this kind. There are many ideas found in it 
not ~ound in the ordinary works, and it is well written. 
Reminiscences 
Carl Schurz' Reminiscences, New York, 1907, Vol. III. is 
a rather biased story of events between 1863-1889. This book 
cannot be used too exjensively because of Mr. Schurz' politi-
cal affiliations and activities. George w. Julian, radi•al 
politician from Indiana, has wri~ten a small volume entitled 
Personal Recollections, 1840-1872, Chicago, 1884, which is so 
highly colored as to be of small historical value except as an 
indication of this type of opinion. Our study here has shown 
a few of the inconsistent ideas in this book. Hugh McCulloch, 
Secretary of the Treasury, was associated with both Lincoln 
and Johnson. Along with Gideon Welles, he most assuredly pro-
vides the outstanding stery of personal reminiscences for this 
time~, His book, Men and Measures of Half a Century, New York, 
1888, does not claim to be in chronological order, but includes 
many events just as they came to the author's mind. It must be 
remembered that the book was not published until 1888, but 
nevertaeless, it is quite reliable. The three-volume Diary of 
Gi4eon Welles, New York,l911, is the most exact, chronological 
account from the pen of one who was associated with Johnson 
from the beginning. It is interesting, fav&rs Johnson, is 
quite accurate, and is the most complete of all this period. 
General SecQndary Works 
James G. Blaine's, Twenty Years of Congress, Norwich Conny 
ecticut, 1886, is useful and very suggestive, but also often 
inaccurate and strongly partisan. The book by John w. Burgess, 
Reconstruction and the Constitution, New York, 1907, deals 
incisively with the palitical and legal aspects of the period. 
William A. Dunning's Reconstruction,Political and ~con•mic, 
New York,l907, gives a good anal~sis of the principle Consti-
tutional developments of the reconstruction in the South. fwo 
standard historical texts have been used in preparing this 
atudy; James Ford Rhodes', History of the United States from 
the Compromise of 1850, New York, 1906, and Ellis Paxson 
Oberholtzer's , A History of the United States since the Civil 
~' New York, 1922. Rhodes is not an admirer of Andrew John-
son, and his book probably favozs the Radicals slightly too 
much, while Oberholtzer is favorable to Johnson. The latte~ 
stresses periodiaal material, and. his volumes include a more 
general view of social and economic problems than those of 
Rhodes. Volume v. of Woodrow Wilson's History of the American 
People, New York, 1961, is a brief but just and well-propor-
tioned account of this period. For a one-volume work on the 
Lincoln of reconstruction, none is more complete than that 
~itten'by Charles McCarthy entitled The Lincoln Plan of Re-
construction, New York, 1901. The !ge of Hate, New York, 1930, 
by George Fort Milton, is one of the most exceptional pieces 
of writing available for this study. An unusual number of 
manuscript sources have been used, and the bibliography is ex-
tensive. A more standard type of work is that written by David 
s. Muzzey, The American Adventure, Volume II, New York, 1927. 
This is an ideal volume from which to secure economic and 
social developments in American history. Frederic L. Paxson's 
two books, Recent History of the United States, New York, 1921, 
and The New Nation, New York, 1919, may be correlated with 
suah a study as this in order to provide a sequence of eTents 
and maintain continuity. John Spencer Bassett's A Short History 
of the united States, New York, 1921, is the last volume used 
in our study, and is probably unsurpassed as a one-volume 
history of the United States. 
The thesis, "The Attitude of the Press toward Andrew 
johnson," written by Ralph w. Tolson, has been accepted 
by the Graduate School of Loyola university with refer-
ence to form, and by the readers whose names appear 
below with reference to content. It is, therefore, 
accepted as a partial fulfilment of the requirements 
of the degree conferred. 
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